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The prevalence of team-based entrepreneurship has evoked a growing 
scholarly interest in entrepreneurial teams. However, there is scant research 
attention devoted to the evolution of IT entrepreneurial teams along their early 
entrepreneurial lifecycles. In view of that, this study endeavors to unravel the 
dynamic evolvement paths of different IT entrepreneurial teams along the early 
development stages. Specifically, my study aims at addressing two research 
questions: (1) How do IT entrepreneurial teams adapt their team structures to the 
changing venture strategies and market contexts at different early stages? (2) Why 
are the structural adaptation accelerated in some IT entrepreneurial teams while 
postponed or even abandoned in other IT entrepreneurial teams? 
To address these research questions, I conduct a multiple-case study on six 
typical IT entrepreneurial teams and collect longitudinal qualitative data to 
understand how these teams dynamically evolve during their early stages. Using 
the four basic principles of evolutionary theory as the theoretical guide, I move 
back and forth between relevant literatures and qualitative case data to generate a 
number of interesting findings.  
There are four major findings in this study. First, IT entrepreneurial teams 
formulate and renew the strategies of their ventures to align with surrounding 
market contexts at early stages. Three venture strategies are devised by IT 
entrepreneurial teams in response to the two aspects of market contexts (i.e., 
market uncertainty and market competition). R&D strategy is formulated for a 
market with high uncertainty and low competition. Market exploitation is 
designed for market with low uncertainty and median competition. Strategic 
diversification is conceived for market with low uncertainty and high competition. 
Second, IT entrepreneurial teams constantly adapt their teams’ 
compositional and managerial structures to better execute the venture strategies at 
different early stages. For IT entrepreneurial teams conducting R&D, a 
compositional structure with shared working experience, shared industry 
knowledge and homogeneous technical backgrounds and a managerial structure 
of empowering leadership ensure the success of R&D. For IT entrepreneurial 
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teams exploiting the market, a compositional structure with diverse working 
experience, shared industry knowledge and heterogeneous functional backgrounds 
and a managerial structure of directive leadership pave the way for effective 
exploitation. For IT entrepreneurial teams strategically diversifying their 
businesses, a compositional structure with diverse working experience, diverse 
industry knowledge and heterogeneous functional backgrounds and a managerial 
structure of empowering leadership lead to successful diversification. Two 
evolutionary paths of the IT entrepreneurial teams are identified, both of which 
closely resemble the process of continuous change and time-paced evolution. 
Third, this study highlights the complementary roles of IT entrepreneurial 
team’s founding resources and learning processes in the structural adaptation by 
the team. The potentials and values embedded in the human capital and social 
capital possessed by IT entrepreneurial team’s founders can only be fully 
exploited through various types of learning processes. Meanwhile, entrepreneurial 
learning processes in return work as transformative mechanisms to make up for 
the insufficiencies of founding resources. Entrepreneurial team’s founding 
resources and learning processes work together in explaining the speed of team 
evolution. 
Fourth, this study also amplifies the literature on entrepreneurial team 
turnover. I find that the entrances of new team members are typically motivated 
by the venture’s needs for supplementary, complementary, or diversification 
resources. However, the additions of new team members do not significantly alter 
the strategic visions held by current members. In addition, I discover that the exits 
of team members are usually instigated by intrapersonal conflicts or interpersonal 
conflicts on strategic visions. Nevertheless, the withdrawals of current members 
have a contingent effect on venture performance, depending on the resource 
possessed by these leaving members. 
I summarize the findings of this study into an evolutionary account of IT 
entrepreneurial teams. This evolutionary account, coupled with the case evidences 
and theoretical framework provided, can help IS scholars understand the 
evolutionary paths of entrepreneurial teams in the IT industry, and guide them in 
 ix 
 
future exploration through this novel lens. Important theoretical and practical 
contributions are drawn. Limitations and future research directions are also 
discussed at the end of this paper. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis focuses on entrepreneurial teams in the IT industry. It explores 
how IT entrepreneurial teams change their team structures and evolve along with 
their venture strategies and surrounding market contexts during the early stages of 
venture development. Additionally, it discusses on how the team’s resources and 
learning processes jointly influence the structural changes of IT entrepreneurial 
teams. Applying the evolutionary theory and relevant literatures of 
entrepreneurship to analyze the data of multiple cases, this thesis shows that the 
four basic principles of evolutionary theory work together to explain the 
evolutionary process of IT entrepreneurial teams. Moreover, the case evidences 
further develop the evolutionary theory by discussing the complementarity 
between team resources and learning processes in determining the speed of team 
evolution. By doing so, this study enriches the connotations of evolutionary 
theory and entrepreneurship literature by proposing a theory of entrepreneurial 
team evolution. Furthermore, findings of this study also echo and develop 
relevant findings on the entrepreneurial team turnover. The first chapter motivates 
the research and presents definitions central to this thesis. The chapter ends with 
the expected contributions of the thesis. 
 
1.1 IT Entrepreneurial Team as a Prominent Research Area 
As the world steps into the information era, the IT industry has become 
one of the most vibrant and promising industries. Instigated by the infinite power 
of IT technologies, a huge number of entrepreneurial firms are established to 
exploit the opportunities in the IT market. Despite the proliferating number of IT 
start-ups, it is not until recently the Information Systems (IS) discipline starts to 
research entrepreneurial firms operating in the IT industry (Skinner 2008). This 
emerging scholarly interest is also represented in a recent editorial in the MIS 
Quarterly (Del Giudice and Straub 2011) which sought to draw the attention of IS 
scholars to the “marriage” of IT and entrepreneurship. Comparing to 
entrepreneurial firms in non-IT industries, entrepreneurial firms operating in the 
IT industry enjoy higher growth rate (Pilat and Wolfl 2004) but bear more risks 
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(Lasch et al. 2007), due to several inherent characteristics of the IT market, such 
as high technology volatility (Anderson et al. 2000), great market uncertainty 
(Mendelson 2000), and intensive market competition (Kim et al. 2000). All these 
idiosyncratic characteristics imply that the development paths and critical success 
factors of IT start-ups might be of sufficient difference to those in non-IT 
industries. Hence, it is imperative to examine the strategies and management of IT 
start-ups.  
Adding to the motivation above, there is a rapid growth of team-based 
entrepreneurship in recent years (Brannon et al. 2013; Leung et al. 2013; Sciascia 
2013), especially in the IT industry (O’Connor et al. 2006; Zhao 2008). 
Entrepreneurial teams have acquired a core position in the creation and 
management of many IT start-ups (Lim et al. 2013; Matlay and Westhead 2005, 
2007; West 2007). Different from early entrepreneurship research portraying the 
individual entrepreneur as a lonely hero, recent studies have shown that 
entrepreneurship is indeed a highly social endeavor (Aldrich et al., 2002). In fact, 
a significant portion of new firms are created and managed by teams with two or 
more people (Francis and Sandberg 2000). The increasingly popular team-based 
entrepreneurship embraces a number of superiorities comparing to the individual-
based or solo entrepreneurship (Chandler and Lyon 2001). Entrepreneurial team, 
with the diversity of their members, can often achieve higher level of 
comprehensiveness in their task delegation and decision making activities 
(Beckman 2006). In addition, entrepreneurial teams can often capitalize on their 
heterogeneous personal networks to gain access to abundant resources (Bjørnåli 
and Aspelund 2012). These superiorities have contributed to a higher success rate 
of team-based entrepreneurial firms (Watson et al. 1995). As mentioned above, 
start-ups in the IT industry face more risks and challenges due to the idiosyncratic 
nature of IT market, which further underlines the needs and values of 
entrepreneurial team. Hence, studying entrepreneurial team in these IT start-ups 
can simultaneously contribute to the theories and practices of IS discipline and 
entrepreneurship discipline. Therefore, it may be extremely fruitful to further 
develop the IT entrepreneurial team as an independent research area.  
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One of the most discussed team issues in entrepreneurship literature deals 
with the structures of entrepreneurial teams (e.g., Ruef et al. 2003). The extant 
literature on entrepreneurial teams has adopted various theoretical lenses to 
identify a wide range of team compositional factors (e.g., educational level, 
functional characteristics, prior entrepreneurial/working experience, and network 
structures of team members) that may influence the team effectiveness and 
venture performance. However, the literature has produced mixed results in terms 
of which structural configurations lead to better performance (Vyakarnam and 
Handelberg 2005). For the compositional structure, there are still debates on 
whether compositional heterogeneity or homogeneity is more germane to venture 
success (Chowdhury 2005). Scholars advocating heterogeneity primarily adopted 
the upper echelon perspective (Hambrick and Mason 1984) and social network 
theory (Aldrich and Zimmer 1986). They suggest that compositional 
heterogeneity (e.g., demographic diversity, diversity in prior affiliations, 
functional diversity) fosters venture team effectiveness and venture performance 
(e.g., Beckman 2006; Chandler and Lyon 2001; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 
1990; Ensley and Hmieleski 2005; Foo et al. 2005), by providing access to a 
broader range of skill set and knowledge pools needed to manage and grow the 
venture (Kor and Mahoney 2000; Talaulicar et al. 2005). However, researchers 
also warned us that compositional heterogeneity may arouse relational or affective 
conflict, which divert the team’s attention from actual development of the 
business to dealing with these conflicts (Amason et al. 2006; Ensley and Pearce 
2001; Jehn 1995). Therefore, some researchers rely on the social identity theory 
(Ruef et al. 2003) and social categorization theory (Turner 1985) to promote that 
compositional homogeneity ensures team stability (Chandler et al. 2005; 
Ucbasaran et al. 2003); enhances team cohesion (Birley and Stockley 2000), and 
enables quick exploitation (Beckman 2006). For managerial structure, researchers 
also divert on which leadership style is more effective for venture performance 
(Hmieleski and Ensley 2007). Some researchers found that empowering 
leadership is positively related to venture performance by fostering the 
motivation, confidence and commitment of fellow entrepreneurial team members 
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and enhancing the team potency (Ensley et al. 2003; Pearce et al. 2003; Spreitzer 
1996). However, some other researchers oppose by stating that empowering 
leadership may have counterproductive effect in that it may lead to more conflicts 
among team members, slowing down the speed of decision making (Amason 
1996; Gebert et al. 2003; Kirzner 1997). Hence, they solicit that directive 
leadership can help facilitate the formation of a collective vision among team 
members (Mumford et al. 2001; Shalley and Gilson 2004), which is one of the 
most important determinants for venture survival and growth (Ensley and Pearce 
2001). Taken in concert, entrepreneurial team researchers have not reached a 
consensus on which team compositional and managerial structures are most 
germane for entrepreneurial success.  
To resolve the above conflicting findings, recent entrepreneurial team 
researchers suggest that entrepreneurial teams change over time and cannot be 
studied as immutable entities (e.g., Ucbasaran et al. 2003; Vanaelst et al. 2006). 
Therefore, the team structures must constantly change to meet the strategic needs 
of the venture at different entrepreneurial stages (Birley and Stockley 2000; 
Partanen et al. 2008). From a contingent perspective, it has been suggested that 
the structures of entrepreneurial teams should be matched with their venture 
strategies to foster venture performance (Beckman et al. 2006; Boeker 1988; 
Shane and Stuart 2002). Changes in the environments surrounding the venture 
may alter the appropriate strategies pursued by the venture, which in turn prompts 
the entrepreneurial teams to adjust their structures so as to better execute the new 
strategies (Aldrich and Martinez 2001; Ensley et al. 2006; Hmieleski and Ensley 
2007). Although the adaptation needs of entrepreneurial team structures are 
recognized by most researchers, there is still a dearth of research examining how 
the entrepreneurial team structures continuously change over time to adapt to the 
changing venture strategies and environments (Klotz et al. 2014). Without 
unravelling the continuous adaptation processes of entrepreneurial team structures, 
we cannot reach a complete understanding of the evolutions of entrepreneurial 
team. My study hence aims to enrich the entrepreneurship literature by studying 
the continuous adaptation of entrepreneurial team structures. 
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Meanwhile, there are two contradicting research streams on the influential 
factors for structural adaptation by entrepreneurial team. One stream of research 
adopts the resource-based perspective and highlights the “imprinting effects” of 
entrepreneurial team’s founding resources on their structure adaptations (e.g., 
Beckman and Burton 2008; DeTienne and Cardon 2012; Leung et al. 2013). 
Researchers in this stream suggested that the resources possessed by 
entrepreneurial founders could have a long-lasting effect on the viability of the 
team (Benson and Davidsson 2003). Since the entrepreneurial founders would 
typically stay in the entrepreneurial teams throughout the early stages of the 
venture (Vanaelst et al. 2006), their resources could have a significant, if not 
deterministic effect on the venture team’s survival and growth (Mosey and Wright 
2007). Entrepreneurial teams founded by members with rich human capital and 
social resources could agilely adjust their team structures by utilizing such 
resources, while team founded by members without abundant resources are more 
vulnerable to environmental shocks (Chandler et al. 2005). Another stream of 
research follows the organizational learning perspective and promotes the values 
of entrepreneurial learning on the structural adaptation by entrepreneurial teams 
(e.g., Berglund et al. 2007; Clarysse and Moray 2004; Karatas-Ozkan 2011). 
Researchers in this stream argue that the resources of founding teams only have a 
transitory effect on the venture performance and entrepreneurial team members 
could strategically transform their team resources and structures through intense 
learning, improvisation, and response to feedbacks from the environment along 
their development stages (e.g., Deakins and Freel 1998; Ferriani et al. 2012; 
Knockaert 2011). While these two streams of research both have their own merits 
and theoretical foundations, there is no consensus between these two perspectives 
and no research to date trying to reconcile them in a single empirical study. Hence, 
this study aims to address this research gap by examining how the entrepreneurial 
team’s founding resource and learning processes interplay in the team’s structural 
adaptation process.  
Furthermore, although performance has long been treated as an outcome 
of team structures and dynamics (e.g., Chandler et al. 2005; Knockaert et al. 2011; 
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Packalen 2007), researchers on top management teams have noted that past 
performance could plausibly influence the subsequent configuration and 
development of the team, i.e., the relationship may go in reverse direction (cf. 
Wagner et al. 1984). It could well be the case that the venture performance may 
pose a significant impact on the stability and development of the entrepreneurial 
team itself (a matter of reverse causality) (Hellerstedt 2009). Although a few 
entrepreneurial team researchers have started to examine this reverse causality in 
their studies (e.g., Boeker and Wiltbank 2005; Hellerstedt 2009; Hellerstedt and 
Aldrich 2008), their reliance on quantitative data hampers their ability to reach a 
clear and coherent understanding of the interplays between team dynamics and 
venture performance within and across different entrepreneurial stages. Collecting 
longitudinal qualitative data could help mitigate this constraint in that longitudinal 
qualitative data can fully reveal the intricate causal links between venture 
performance and team dynamics. Thus, by tracing the evolvement of 
entrepreneurial teams through a longitudinal qualitative design, the thesis is 
endowed with the opportunity to gain a better understanding of the feedback loops 
from venture performance to team dynamics. 
Apart from that, most of the prior research has dwelled on the formation of 
entrepreneurial teams. For example, Ruef et al. (2003) examined how 
entrepreneurial teams are founded based on five mechanisms of group 
composition – homophily, functionality, status expectations, network constraint, 
and ecological constraint. Similarly, Aldrich and Kim (2007) adopted the social 
network perspective to compare and contrast two models of entrepreneurial team 
formation (i.e., rational process model and interpersonal relations model). 
However, all of these studies only portrayed the evolvement of entrepreneurial 
teams until actual start-up of the venture. Very little is known about the 
evolvement of the entrepreneurial team after venture creation. As the early 
development phases after venture’s legal creation are the phases where the 
entrepreneurial teams actually function and manage the ventures (Clarysse and 
Moray 2004), and the uncertainty and ambiguity of these early stages are most 
problematic (Andries and Debackere 2007), these early stages are just as 
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important as the pre-start-up stages. Hence it is imperative for this study to 
examine the evolution of entrepreneurial teams during the early development 
stages after the venture creation.  
Taken together, previous studies (1) rationalize the values of examining 
the IT entrepreneurial teams, (2) recognize the contingent effects of 
entrepreneurial team structures on venture performance and the need to study the 
continuous adaptation of team structures, (3) identify the imprinting effects and 
learning effects on structural adaptation of the team, (4) realize the potential 
feedback loops from venture performance to team dynamics, (5) suggest the 
prominent roles played by entrepreneurial team at venture’s early stages. But the 
literature lacks an in-depth account of how IT entrepreneurial teams continuously 
adapt their team structures to evolve with the internal and external environments 
of their ventures at early stages. Hence, my study aims at addressing this 
important research gap.  
 
1.2 Research Questions 
More precisely, the main research questions covered in this thesis include: 
1. How does IT entrepreneurial team’s structure evolve to adapt to the 
changing venture strategies and market contexts at different early 
stages?  
2. Why are the structural adaptation accelerated in some IT 
entrepreneurial teams while postponed or even abandoned in other IT 
entrepreneurial teams? 
The first question deals with the continuous adaptation in IT 
entrepreneurial team’s structure to fit with the venture strategies and market 
conditions at different early stages. The second question aims at explaining the 
efficiency of team’s structural adaptation by considering the interactive effects of 







By conducting this study, I hope to make important theoretical 
contributions to several streams of literature. First and foremost, although recent 
IS researchers have recognized the tight interconnectedness between IT and 
entrepreneurial endeavors (Del Giudice and Straub 2011), there is still a dearth of 
research in both the IS and entrepreneurship disciplines examining the phenomena 
of IT entrepreneurship. IT industry is characterized by high growth rate (Pilat and 
Wolfl 2004) and high risks (Lasch et al. 2007) stemming from high technological 
volatility (Anderson et al. 2000), high market uncertainty (Mendelson 2000) and 
high market competition (Kim et al. 2000). These idiosyncratic traits of IT 
industry offer both more opportunities and challenges for ventures operating in 
the IT industry. Through the examination of structural adaptation of IT 
entrepreneurial teams and the IT ventures in which the teams operate, this study 
stands as one of the earliest that develop contextualized theories for the 
phenomena of IT entrepreneurship. 
Second, past entrepreneurship literature generally adopts a static approach 
when examining the composition and structure of entrepreneurial teams 
(Beckman et al. 2007; Chandler et al. 2005). This outlook is symptomatic of a 
general trend in the entrepreneurship literature to seek for ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
structures of entrepreneurial teams that fail to consider the full complexity of the 
new venture context (Clarysse and Moray 2004; Vanaelst et al. 2006). Albeit 
entrepreneurship researchers have linked the entrepreneurial team structures to 
venture performance, results are mixed and conflicting, especially in regards to 
the heterogeneity and homogeneity of teams (e.g., Beckman et al. 2007; Chandler 
et al. 2005). These studies have been criticized for their static view towards the 
entrepreneurial team structures (Ucbasaran et al. 2003). More specifically, they 
view entrepreneurial teams as immutable entities and cross-sectionally examine 
their structures at distinct points in the entrepreneurial process, such as entry (Foo 
et al. 2006), initial growth stages (Hmiekleski and Ensley 2007), and IPO 
(Beckman et al. 2007). However, a critical aspect is lost, i.e., the dynamics of 
entrepreneurial teams. Recent research findings adopting a contingency 
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perspective toward entrepreneurial teams have indicated that the structures of 
entrepreneurial teams are relentlessly evolving and the structures must be 
constantly adapted to the changing venture strategies and market conditions (e.g., 
Beckman et al. 2006; Partanen et al. 2008; Vanaelst et al. 2006). By collecting 
longitudinal data on the variance and evolvement paths of entrepreneurial team 
structures, this study echoes and enriches this growing research interest with a 
dynamic discourse of entrepreneurial team. By doing so, this study also helps 
reconcile past conflicting findings on the performance implications of 
entrepreneurial team structures. 
Third, past research on entrepreneurial team borrows various theoretical 
lens when examining entrepreneurial teams, such as social capital theory, social 
network theory, social categorization theory and social identity theory. While all 
these theories have their own merits and explanatory power, they are limited by 
their static assumptions and unable to explain the dynamic evolution of 
entrepreneurial teams. This study creatively applies the evolutionary theory and 
its four basic principles to the study of entrepreneurial teams and justifies their 
soundness and effectiveness for the understanding of entrepreneurial team’s 
dynamic evolution. By doing so, this thesis also helps reconcile and integrate the 
imprinting perspective (Leung et al. 2013) and learning perspective (Knockaert 
2011) into a coherent framework and study their ongoing interactions along the 
evolutionary path of entrepreneurial teams. 
Fourth, recent entrepreneurial team literature has paid growing attentions 
to the reverse causality effects and started to examine the feedback loops from 
venture performance to team structures and dynamics (Boeker and Wiltbank 2005; 
Chandler et al. 2005; Hellerstedt 2009; Hellerstedt and Aldrich 2007). However, 
these research attempts are hindered by their reliance on quantitative data, hence 
being unable to unravel the intricate causal relationships between team dynamics 
and venture performance. In view of that, this study helps to fill this gap by 
collecting longitudinal qualitative data which could better tease apart the reverse 
causality of firm performance on subsequent team dynamics. 
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Fifth, a paucity of research has studied the entrepreneurial team formation 
and evolvement processes until the actual start-up of the venture (Aldrich and 
Kim 2007; Ruef et al. 2003). However, the evolutions of entrepreneurial teams in 
the early stages after the legal creation are more critical for the venture survival 
and growth. By tracing the evolvement of entrepreneurial teams throughout their 
venture’s early development stages, this study provides effective theoretical 
guidelines for the management of entrepreneurial teams at such early stages. 
My thesis has prominent practical implications as well. First, results of 
this study enable entrepreneurial teams-to-be to conduct comprehensive 
evaluation of their team resources, structures, learning processes, venture 
strategies and market contexts, so as to properly adapt their team structures to the 
strategic needs in different market contexts at different early stages. For example, 
when a group of IT experts team up to start an IT venture to pursue R&D, joint 
working experience and shared product knowledge among these technical genius 
as well as an IT empowering leadership style are necessary preconditions for 
R&D success. However, when the venture makes the market exploitation as its 
strategic focus, a functionally diverse team with diverse working experience and 
business directive leadership style becomes more beneficial. In addition, when the 
venture plans to diversify its business, the diversity of team members’ industry 
knowledge and a business empowering leadership style are critical prerequisites. 
Second, consultants/advisors of entrepreneurship could take away from my 
findings some practical guidelines for the entrepreneurial teams. For example, 
they could help promote the various types of entrepreneurial learning in the teams 
to strengthen their adaptation capabilities. Third, venture capitalists/investors can 
also learn from this study. They should always look into the resources possessed 
by the venture teams when they evaluate the team’s potency, rather than solely 
focusing on the temporal structures of the team. They should also help the venture 
teams they support to meet their strategic goals at different situations. For 
example, when the venture teams try to expand their business scopes, they could 
help them by introducing competent specialists from the new business lines. 
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Fourth, policy makers could increase the survival rate of the entrepreneurial teams 
by providing necessary intellectual as well as socializing supports. 
 
1.4 Definitions of Central Concepts 
1.4.1 IT Entrepreneurship 
Before I present the major insights and findings of this study, some core 
concepts need to be clarified. Two most apparent ones are IT entrepreneurship 
and entrepreneurial teams. Past literature has offered a plethora of definitions for 
entrepreneurship. However, the quest for consensus in definitions has not been 
successful (Shane and Venkataraman 2000). Below are some examples of 
definitions for entrepreneurship (see Table 1 below). 




Entrepreneurship as a 
trait or personality 
Busenitz and Barney (1997, p. 
11) 
“Entrepreneurs have been described 
as risk takers and rugged 
individualists…as engaging in 
deviate social behaviour…and as 
being a ‘breed apart’.” 
Burch (1986, p. 15) “A galaxy of personality traits 
characterize individuals who have a 
propensity to behave 







Entrepreneurship as a 
process or behavior 
Schumpeter (1934, p. 64) “A process of creative destruction” 
Davidsson (2004, p.8) “New economic activity” 
Harper (2008, p. 613) “A profit-seeking problem-solving 
process that takes place under 
conditions of structural uncertainty”  
Stevenson and Jarillo (1990, 
p. 23) 
“The process by which individuals – 
either on their own or inside 
organizations – pursue opportunities 
without regard to the resources they 
currently control” 
Shane and Venkataraman 
(2000, p. 218) 
“The process of discovery, 
evaluation, and exploitation of 
opportunities” 
Entrepreneurship as an 
actual action of starting 
and operating new 
venture 
Gartner (1988, p.11) “Creation of new organizations” 
Low and McMillan (1988, 
p.141) 
“Creation of new enterprise” 
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As can be seen from the table, although the definitions all regarded 
entrepreneurship as the creation of something new, they deviate from one another 
in terms of the substance and representation of the entrepreneurship. The greatest 
difference lies in whether entrepreneurship should be seen as an innate 
characteristic (Bird 1989), a process of creative destruction (Schumpeter 1934), or 
actual behavior leading to the creation of new venture (Davidsson 2004). Some 
scholars view entrepreneurship as a personality trait that individuals always 
pursue something that are new, be it innovative or imitative (McClelland 1987). 
Some other scholars regard entrepreneurship as a process or behaviour of creative 
destruction (Schumpeter 1934; Stevenson and Jarilo 1990). And some other 
scholars emphasize entrepreneurship as an actual behavior or action of starting 
and operating a new venture to exploit the new opportunities identified (Gartner 
1988; Low and MacMillan 1988). As merely focusing on creative personality as a 
qualifier for entrepreneurship would cause problems (Davidsson 2004), and this 
study focuses on the creation and management of new organizations, I adopted 
the view by Gartner (1988) and Low and MacMillan (1988) and considered 
entrepreneurship as a new economic activity in which people create and operate 
new ventures to exploit market opportunities.  
Research applying the general entrepreneurship literature to the IS 
discipline and examining the interplay of IT and entrepreneurship can be 
generally classified into two streams. One stream examines the traditional 
industries such as manufacturing and logistics industries and tries to understand 
how IT can enable or accelerate entrepreneurial endeavors in these industries. To 
release the full potential of IT for entrepreneurial performance, entrepreneurial 
firms must access IT architectural tools and understand the opportunities 
originating from new IT (See 2004). As summarized by Del Giudice and Straub 
(2011), there are two fundamental ways IT can facilitate start-ups and improve 
business performance: (1) reduce transaction costs and losses in terms of 
coordinating different activities, and (2) lead to the improvement of intra- and 
inter-organizational routines. The other stream of research focuses on the IT 
industry itself and examines how entrepreneurial firms operating in IT industry 
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can discover, evaluate, and exploit opportunities of new information technologies 
to create and deliver new IT products or IT services (Shane and Venkataraman 
2000). Entrepreneurial firms in the IT industry typically struggle to survive and 
grow by providing a range of IT products, such as computer software, enterprise 
information systems, web applications, or IT services, such as database 
management, web service hosting, and IT service outsourcing. Entrepreneurial 
firms operating in IT industry see more opportunities as well as more risks due to 
several inherent characteristics of the IT industry, such as high market volatility 
(Anderson et al. 2000), great market uncertainty (Mendelson 2000), and intensive 
market competition (Kim et al. 2000). The former research stream has received a 
fair amount of attention in the literature of IT-enabled innovation/transformation 
or IT-enabled entrepreneurship (e.g., Elliot 2011; Corbett 2013; Joshi et al. 2010). 
However, the latter research stream has received very few scholarly attention in 
the IS literature, even though the idiosyncratic nature of the IT market has been 
recognized by IS researchers. From a lifecycle perspective (Greiner 1972), 
scholars have portrayed that this kind of high-technology firms are usually 
founded by specialized technological geniuses, who are replaced later by 
managerial professionals when the firms grow beyond the capabilities of these 
technical founders (Hellman and Puri 2002; Boeker and Karachalil 2002). Hence, 
the management teams of these IT start-ups tend to be unstable and change 
relentlessly along the entrepreneurial lifecycle. Hence, the entrepreneurial teams 
in IT industry represent an ideal subject to examine the dynamic evolution of 
entrepreneurial teams. In view of that, this thesis follows the latter stream of 
research and focuses on the entrepreneurial firms that operate in the IT industry 
and provide IT products and/or IT services. IT entrepreneurship in this study is 
hence defined as the creation of new IT organizations to exploit the IT market 
opportunities by providing IT products or IT services.  
 
1.4.2 IT Entrepreneurial Team 
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Entrepreneurship researchers have adopted a number of different 
definitions on who is a member of the entrepreneurial team. Table 2 presents a 
selection of the definitions for entrepreneurial teams in previous research. 
Table 2. Overview of Different Definitions of Entrepreneurial Team 
Reference Definition 
Chowdhury (2005, p. 735) “Have multiple founders, founders must be 
participants in decision making, and founders 
must hold equity shares” 
Cooper and Bruno (1977, p. 18) “Companies started by two or more full-time 
founders” 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990, p. 515) “Individuals who were founders of the firm and 
who worked full time for the firm in executive-
level positions at the time of founding” 
Ensley et al. (2002, p. 372) “Individuals who met at least two of three 
conditions: (1) founders; (2) currently held an 
equity stake of at least 10%; (3) were identified 
in some way as being actively involved in 
strategic decision making” 
Harper (2008, p. 614) “A group of entrepreneurs with a common goal 
that can only be achieved by appropriate 
combinations of individual entrepreneurial 
actions” 
Knockaret et al. (2011, p. 781) “The group of people involved in the creation 
and management of a new venture” 
Ruef et al. (2003, p. 205) “Co-founders actively involving in the start-up 
process and sharing ownership” 
Watson et al. (1995, p. 394) “Two or more individuals who jointly 
establishand actively participate in a business in 
which they have an equity (financial) interest” 
Most definitions focus on teams that are engaged in nascent ventures 
(Harper 2008) and equate entrepreneurial teams with new venture teams or 
founding teams. Although entrepreneurial teams can also exist in established 
businesses (Cooney 2005), given my definition for IT entrepreneurship as actions 
of creating new IT start-ups, I follow Harper (2008)’s definition and focus on the 
entrepreneurial teams that operate in newly founded ventures, rather than 
established large firms. Even though there are some differences between studies 
on the criteria of entrepreneurial team membership, the literature generally share 
some commonalities. From the literature, there are two common criteria, which 
are ownership and being involved in running the venture. The founding team is 
thus the group of individuals that own and manage the venture during the first 
year of firm legal inception. As I am studying the development of the 
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entrepreneurial team over time, it is important to not only focus on the founding 
team, but also acknowledge that the team may change over time (Hellerstedt 
2009).  
Hence, in this study, I define the IT entrepreneurial team as a group of 
individual entrepreneurs who jointly share ownership and manage the IT venture 
along its lifecycle. An IT entrepreneurial team member is thus a person who both 
possesses ownership and makes strategic managerial decisions for the IT venture.  
 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
In order to embark on the quest for answers to my research questions, the 
thesis proceeds as follow: 
- Chapter 2 starts with a brief review of different research streams in the 
entrepreneurial team literature. This review is then followed by the 
introduction of the entrepreneurial lifecycle and the evolutionary 
theory of firm. After that, relevant literature adopting the evolutionary 
theory of firm to study entrepreneurial teams is also reviewed. Based 
on these literature reviews, merits and limitations of the evolutionary 
theory of firm are discussed, and the need to develop a contextualized 
theory for IT entrepreneurial team’s evolution is emphasized.  
- Chapter 3 concerns with the research method and explicates the 
research design, sample selection, data collection and analysis methods.  
- Chapter 4 provides detailed case descriptions and analysis on the 
evolutionary paths of the six IT entrepreneurial teams within and 
across the two early stages (i.e., emergent stage, early growth stage). 
- Chapter 5 bases on the case descriptions and analysis in previous 
chapter to discuss about the contributions and developments of 
findings of this study to relevant literature.  
- Chapter 6 illustrates the theoretical and practical contributions of this 
thesis. Research limitations and suggestions for future research are 
also discussed. Some concluding remarks are also provided at the end 
of this paper. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
In this chapter, I bring out the need to develop a contextualized theory for 
IT entrepreneurial team. The theoretical lens of my study is the evolutionary 
theory of firm (Nelson and Winter 1985). I try to apply this theory to the context 
of IT entrepreneurial team and develop a contextualized theory for the evolution 
of IT entrepreneurial team.  
In his seminal article of theory contextualization, Zahra (2007) proposes 
that when contextualize an existing established theory to emerging and novel 
phenomena, researchers must follow three steps: (1) establish relevance of the 
established theory to the new phenomena, (2) provide a fair test of basic 
arguments underlying the established theory, (3) give back to the theory: how do 
the results alter the assumptions and predications of the established theory. 
Following this approach, I first conducted extensive literature search on relevant 
literature of entrepreneurial team and the evolutionary theory of firm. Then I 
conduct longitudinal multiple-case study and collect data on the evolution of 
different IT entrepreneurial teams to see whether the basic arguments of 
evolutionary theory of firm still hold in the IT entrepreneurial team context. 
Finally, I compare the research findings to the theoretical tenets of evolutionary 
theory of firm and see how the findings enrich and develop the evolutionary 
theory of firm.  
Following the procedures suggested by Heugens and Lander (2009), I 
search for relevant literatures by both keyword search and manual search methods 
in large literature databases (e.g., ProQuest, ScienceDirect, Elsevier, and Jstor) 
and relevant professional academic journals on entrepreneurship (e.g., Journal of 
Business Venturing, Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, Strategic 
Entrepreneurship Journal) and evolutionary theory (e.g., Journal of Evolutionary 
Economics). I adopt a two-way snowball technique (backward-tracing and 
forward-tracing) when I search the literature. And I select research papers that are 
pertinent to the topic of my study. In this literature review chapter, I first present 
different research streams of entrepreneurial team literature. After that, the notion 
 17 
 
of entrepreneurial lifecycle and the theoretical tenets of evolutionary theory are 
introduced. Then, the applicability of evolutionary theory of firm to the context of 
entrepreneurial team is theoretically justified. And relevant entrepreneurial team 
literature adopting the evolutionary theory of firm is also offered. Towards the 
end of this chapter, merits and limitations of evolutionary theory of firm are 
elaborated and the potentials of IT entrepreneurial team as a new context to 
advance the evolutionary theory of firm is anticipated and discussed.  
 
2.1 Different Research Streams of Entrepreneurial Team Literature 
With the prevalence of team-based entrepreneurship, researchers have 
launched the examination of entrepreneurial teams from different angles. In this 
section, I briefly review the different research areas pertaining to the 
entrepreneurial teams. This section aims at familiarizing the readers with the 
current developments of the entrepreneurial team literature, and offering some 
theoretical elements for the development of a contextualized theory of 
entrepreneurial team evolution in subsequent sections.  
 
2.1.1 Entrepreneurial Team Resource 
According to the resource-based view, competitive advantages derive 
from resources that are inimitable (Pringle and Knoll 1997). Entrepreneurial team 
researchers have identified the human capital and social capital as being two 
critical resources for entrepreneurial teams (Benson and Davidsson 2003).  
Human capital is a key type of resource for entrepreneurial team. It 
denotes the intellectual knowledge possessed by the entrepreneurial team 
members (Colombo and Grill 2005). There are two components of human capital: 
generic human capital and specific human capital (Marvel and Lumpkin 2007). 
Generic human capital refers to the general knowledge acquired by entrepreneurs 
through formal education and professional experience, while specific human 
capital denotes the capabilities that entrepreneurs can directly apply to the jobs in 
the new ventures (Becker 1975). Past literature suggests that the specific human 
capitals, such as technical knowledge and managerial experience that are 
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accumulated through a number of years of working in different functions or 
different industries are more critical for the survival and growth of the venture. 
However, regardless of the types, human capital has been found to have a positive 
effect on the creation and growth of the venture, especially when it fits with the 
venture strategies (e.g., Allen et al. 2007; Chandler et al. 2005; Davidsson and 
Honig 2003; Marvel and Lumpkin 2007; Mosey and Wright 2007; Shrader and 
Siegel 2007; (for a comprehensive review, see Unger et al. 2011)).  
Social capital is another type of key resources possessed by 
entrepreneurial teams. It refers to the intra-industry and extra-industry resources 
that the entrepreneurial teams could attain through the external networks of their 
members (Stam and Elfring 2008). The relationships of entrepreneurial team 
members with external parties have been found to facilitate the progress of 
venture creation and ensure the venture success through raising levels of illusions 
of control (Carolis and Saparito 2006; Carolis et al. 2009), creating distinctive 
knowledge base (Yli-Renko et al. 2002), and accelerating entrepreneurial 
discovery and exploitation processes (Davidsson and Honig 2003). For example, 
Ozgen and Baron (2007) empirically justified that the social sources derived from 
mentors, professional forums and informal industry networks work as social 
capital in promoting opportunity recognition. Batjargal and Liu (2004) suggested 
that the entrepreneurial team’s access to private equity can foster the venture 
performance. In addition, entrepreneurial teams access to non-redundant 
information from heterogeneous social networks can exploit the benefits of 
brokering structure holes and foster creative actions (Ruef 2002) and enhance 
firm performance (Vissa and Chacar 2009). Table 3 below provides a brief 




Table 3. Selected Studies on Entrepreneurial Team Resources 




Dimenion of Team 
Resources Mentioned 
Allen et al. 
2007 
Empirical: Quantitative survey on 400 




Faculties with tenure are more likely to engage in 
patenting. 







Empirical: Archival panel data 
analysis on 506 Italian young firms 
operating in high-tech industries 
Competence-based 
theories 
Founders’ years of university education in economic 
and managerial fields and to a lesser extent in 
scientific and technical fields positively affect growth 
while education in other fields does not. 
Founders’ prior work experience in the same industry 
of the new firm is positively associated with growth. 
Technical work experience of founders as opposed to 
their commercial work experience that determines 
growth. 
Individuals in the founding team with prior 
entrepreneurial experiences also results in superior 
growth. 
Human Capital 




Empirical: Quantitative survey on 145 
technology entrepreneurs in the 




General and specific human capital are both vital to 
innovation outcomes. 
Innovation radicalness was positively associated with 
formal education and prior technical knowledge, but 
negatively associated with prior market serving 
knowledge. 
Human Capital 
(Generic and Specific) 
Packalen 
2007 




Founding team’s industry status, entrepreneurially 
relevant demographic features as well as the 
organizations affiliated all positively increase the 
initial cognitive legitimacy and likelihood of external 





Empirical: Archival panel data 
analysis on 198 publicly traded new 




There is a weak direct link between team experience 
and venture performance. 





United States  determinant of the long-term performance of high-
tech entrepreneurial ventures. 
The team’s technological experience is the most 





Empirical: Quantitative survey of 84 




Bridging and bonding social capital, consisting of 
both strong and weak ties, was a robust predictor 
regarding who became a nascent entrepreneur as well 
as for advancing through the start-up process. 
Being a member of a business network had a 
statistically significant positive effect on outcomes 
like first sale or showing a profit. 
Human capital strongly predicts the entry into nascent 
entrepreneurship, but only weakly for carrying the 








Empirical: Qualitative longitudinalcase 
study on 24 academic entrepreneurs 
based in 10 schools of engineering or 




Entrepreneurs with prior business ownership 
experience have broader social networks and are more 
effective in developing network ties.  
Less experienced entrepreneurs likely encounter 
structural holes between their scientific research 
networks and industry networks.  
Support initiatives help attract industry partners for 
novice entrepreneurs from engineering and the 
material sciences but academics based within 
biological sciences encounter greater difficulties 








Empirical: Quantitative survey on 90 
new firms in the open source software 
industry in Netherlands 
Social network 
theory 
The relationship between entrepreneurial orientation 
and venture performance is positively moderated by 
extra-industry bridging ties (relationship is stronger in 





Empirical: Quantitative online survey 




Social capital of entrepreneurs represented by social 
networks and relational capital raise their illusion of 
control, which in turn accelerates the progression of 















Social capital components including structural holes, 
trust, strong ties and shared codes and language will 
increase cognitive biases such as overconfidence, 
illusion of control and representativeness, which in 
turn reduce individual’s risk perception and the 




et al. 2002 
Empirical: Longitudinal study with 
mail survey on 77 technology-based 
new firms in 1993 and follow-up 
telephone interviews with 56 
technology-base new firms in the 
Finnish electronics industry 
Social capital 
theory 
Intra- and inter-organizational relationships help in 
building distinctive knowledge base for the venture 






Empirical: Qualitative longitudinal 
study of face-to-face interviews with 
75 entrepreneurs in post-Soviet Russia 





Relational embeddedness and resource embeddedness 
of personal social networks of entrepreneurs have 
direct positive impacts on firm performance, while 







Empirical: Quantitative survey of 84 
India software ventures 
Social network 
theory 
Structural holes of the entrepreneurial team increase 
the performance of the venture, and this effect 
complements the effect of functional diversity, the 
positive effect of structural holes on venture 
performance will be stronger for teams with greater 





2.1.2 Entrepreneurial Team Structure 
There are two aspects of entrepreneurial team structure that are frequently 
mentioned about in the literature. The first aspect is the compositional structure of 
entrepreneurial team. Entrepreneurial team researchers have resorted to a wide 
range of theoretical lenses (e.g., social network theory, social capital theory, upper 
echelon theory, social identity theory, social categorization theory) to unravel a 
long list of team compositional structures (e.g., age, gender, educational level, 
functional expertise, prior company affiliations, prior entrepreneurial experience, 
general business skills) and linked these compositional structures to venture 
performance (e.g., Carpenter 2002; Carpenter and Fredrickson 2001; Jackson et al. 
1991). One mostly debated issue by researchers in this lane is whether the 
compositional heterogeneity (diversity) or compositional homogeneity 
(homophily) of the team leads to better venture performance. Compositional 
heterogeneity (diversity) refers to the degree of heterogeneity with respect to 
demographic “immutable characteristics such as age, gender and ethnicity; 
attributes describing individuals’ relationships with the firm, such as 
organizational tenure and functional areas; and attributes identifying individuals’ 
position within society, such as marital status” (cf. Lawrence 1997, p. 11). 
Eisenhardt et al. (1990) have discovered that entrepreneurial founding teams with 
greater variations in the industry experience have higher firm growth in a sample 
of 92 semiconductor firms founded between 1978 and 1985. Similarly, Ensley 
and Hmieleski (2005) found that entrepreneurial team heterogeneity in terms of 
education, functional expertise, industry experience, and business skills are 
positively related to net cash flow and sales growth in a sample of 256 startups. 
Foo et al. (2005) empirically found that entrepreneurial team’s diversity in 
education levels is positively related to external evaluation of the value of their 
business ideas. In a similar vein, Beckman et al. (2007) found that functional 
diversity increases the founding entrepreneurial team’s ability to attract venture 
capital and achieve an IPO in 161 high-tech firms.  
However, some other researchers oppose by arguing that compositional 
homogeneity may lead to better outcomes when considering the satisfaction, 
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communication, conflict, and turnover (Jackson et al. 1991; Pearce and Ravlin 
1987). For example, Chatman and Flynn (2001) discovered that greater team 
demographic heterogeneity reduces the cooperative norms and in turn leads to 
less member satisfaction and individual contribution, as well as low team 
efficiency and effectiveness. Similarly, Yu (2002) proposed that diversity in team 
members’ perspective and experiences hinders cooperation and leads to low team 
productivity. Amason et al. (2006) also noted that team heterogeneity might 
negatively influence venture performance, such as in situations whereby 
consensus and communication quality are more important than information 
seeking and decision comprehensiveness. As an effort to reconcile the above 
conflicting findings on team structures, Beckman (2006) proposed that diverse 
prior company affiliations encourages firm exploration while common prior 
company affiliations facilitates firm exploitation. Table 4 below provides a brief 




Table 4. Selected Studies on Entrepreneurial Team Compositional Structures 




Dimensions of Team 
Compositional 
Structure Mentioned 
Beckman 2006 Empirical: Longitudinal field study 
(combining interviews, survey, and 
archival data) of 141 young high-
tech firms in California’s Silicon 





Founding teams with diverse prior company 
affiliations were more likely to have an exploration 
strategy. However, founding teams with common 
prior company affiliations were more likely to have 
an exploitation strategy. Furthermore, founding teams 
with both common and diverse affiliations do the best 






Empirical: Quantitative archival 
data analysis of 92 newly founded 
U.S. semiconductor firms between 





Entrepreneurial founding teams with greater 




Eisenhardt et al. 
1990 
Empirical: Panel data analysis on 92 
U.S. semiconductor firms founded 




Greater variation in the industry experience of the 
founding team members predicts higher growth 





Empirical: Quantitative survey of 
884 officers in 102 high-tech 
university-based start-ups and 154 
independent high-tech new ventures 
in the United States 
Institutional theory University-based start-ups to be comprised of more 
homogenous TMTs with less developed dynamics 
than their independent counterparts.  
Further, university-based start-ups are found to be 
significantly lower performing in terms of net cash 




Beckman et al. 
2007 
Empirical: Longitudinal study 
combining interview, survey and 
archival methods on 161 high-tech 
firms at risk of going public in 
California Silicon Valley of U.S. 
Upper echelon 
perspective 
Functional diversity increases founding team’s ability 
to attract venture capital and achieve an IPO.  
Functional diversity 
Yu 2002 Conceptualization Human capital 
theory, Social 
capital theory 
Diversity in team members’ perspective and 





 Apart from the compositional structure, a second aspect of team structure 
is the managerial structure of entrepreneurial team. Managerial structure deals 
with the aspects of roles and controls in the entrepreneurial team. The most 
discussed managerial structure in entrepreneurial team literature centers on the 
leadership behavior (e.g., Ensley et al. 2003, 2006; Hmieleski and Ensley 2007). 
There is still debate as to which leadership style is better for venture performance. 
Some researchers suggest that empowering leadership, defined as leadership 
behavior that encourages self-rewards, self-leadership, opportunity thinking. 
Participative goal-setting, and independent behavior by follower, subordinates, or 
group members (Pearce et al. 2003), can increase the motivation, confidence, and 
commitment of entrepreneurial team members, which in turn enhance team 
potency and venture performance (Ensley et al. 2003, Pearce et al. 2003; Spreitzer 
1996). However, some other researchers reject this idea and argue that 
empowering or facilitative leadership may produce more dysfunctional conflicts 
among team members, thereby obstructing quick strategic decision making 
(Amason 1996; Gebert et al. 2003; Kirzner 1997). Therefore, they promote that 
directive leadership, where leaders instruct and command followers to carry out 
designated tasks, assign specific non-negotiable goals, and use contingent 
reprimands to facilitate cooperation from followers (Pearce et al. 2003), could 
facilitate the formation of a collective vision among team members (Mumford et 
al. 2001; Shalley and Gilson 2004), which is a critical determinant for the survival 
and growth of the venture (Ensley and Pearce 2001). To resolve this debate, some 
recent scholars try to introduce some moderating variables into the leadership-
performance model (e.g., Hmieleski and Ensley 2007; Ensley et al. 2006; Pearce 
2004). Similarly, there are also debates on some other pairs of contradictory 
leadership styles, such as transactional and transformational leadership (e.g., 
Bommer et al. 2005; Chen 2007; Ling et al. 2008; Pearce and Sims 2002), vertical 
and shared leadership (e.g., Carson et al. 2007; Pearce and Sims 2001). Table 5 




Table 5. Selected Studies on Entrepreneurial Team Managerial Structures 








Chen 2007 Empirical: Quantitative Survey 
of 112 entrepreneurial team 
members in 644 new ventures 
in Taiwan 
Leadership theory Lead entrepreneurs who are risk-taking, pro-active and 
innovative can stimulate their entrepreneurial team members’ 
creativity. Moreover, new venture’s innovative capability can 
be improved by the joint contribution of higher entrepreneurial 






Empirical: Quantitative survey 
of 66 new venture top 
management teams from Inc. 
Magazine’s annual list of 
America’s fastest growing 
private firms 
Leadership theory In dynamic industry environments, startups with 
heterogeneous top management teams were found to perform 
best when led by directive leaders and those with homogenous 
top management teams performed best when led by 
empowering leaders. Conversely in stable industry 
environments, startups with heterogeneous top management 
teams were found to perform best when led by empowering 
leaders and those with homogenous top management teams 




Ensley et al. 
2003 





Shared leadership is conceptualized as an important 
antecedent of our process variables - cohesion and collective 
vision - which in turn are conceptualized as being positively 






Empirical: Quantitative survey 
of the CEOs from 179 new 
ventures in United States 
Affective events 
theory (AET) 
There is a positive indirect effect of shared authentic 
leadership behavior on firm performance, an effect that 
operated through TMTs’ positive affective tone. 
Shared Authentic 
leadership 
 Ensley et 
al. 2006 
Empirical: Quantitative survey 
of 66 new venture top 
management teams from Inc. 
Magazine’s annual list of 
America’s fastest growing 
private firms 
Leadership theory Environmental dynamism has a significant positive 
moderating effect on the relationship between 
transformational leadership and new venture performance, and 
a significant negative moderating effect on the relationship 








2.1.3 Entrepreneurial Team Learning Process 
Entrepreneurial learning is explicitly defined as “the process by which 
people acquire new knowledge from direct experience and from observing the 
behaviors, actions and consequences of others; assimilate new knowledge using 
heuristics to confront discrepancies that are common with information acquired in 
uncertain contexts; and organize assimilated knowledge by linking it with 
preexisting structures” (Holcomb et al. 2009, p. 172). It is a continuous process 
leading to the development of knowledge required for starting and managing a 
venture (Politis 2005). An underlying shared assumption of most studies on 
entrepreneurial learning is that the learning process is rarely planned; rather it is 
the results of a series of reactions to critical events in which entrepreneurs learn to 
process information, adjust strategy and make decisions (Deakins and Freel 1998). 
A number of entrepreneurial learning types have been identified and 
examined by past entrepreneurship researchers (see Wang and Chugh (2013) for 
an extensive literature review), of which two types are most frequently discussed: 
experiential learning (e.g., real-time learning by doing), and vicarious learning 
(e.g., real-time inter-organizational learning) (Deakins and Freel 1998; Holcomb 
et al. 2009). Experiential learning refers to the learning by entrepreneurs from 
their own direct experience of starting and managing the current venture 
(Balasubramanian 2011; Corbett 2005; 2007). Learning by doing is a kind of 
experiential learning that is defined as the trial-and-error learning by 
entrepreneurs as they manage and operate the venture (Clarysse and Moray 2004; 
Cope 2003). Past research has noted that entrepreneurs not only learn about 
themselves and the demise of their ventures, but also about the nature of networks 
and relationships as well as the “pressure points” or failures of venture 
management (e.g., Cope 2005; Cope 2011; Covin et al. 2006; Garcia-Cabrera and 
Garcia-Soto 2009).  
Different from the experiential learning which is directed to their own 
ventures, vicarious learning happens when entrepreneurs mimetically learn from 
the experiences and knowledge of other firms or learning from external advices 
(Bingham and Davis 2012; Holcomb et al. 2009; Jones and Macpherson 2006). It 
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is a kind of real-time learning from the experience of other firms in the same 
business (Sosna et al. 2010). Vicarious learning from other organizations has been 
found to help the venture determine the effective timing of industry entry and 
foster venture performance (e.g., Fang et al. 2010; Levesque et al. 2009). Apart 
from these two major types, some other learning types are also discussed in the 
literature such as congenital learning (Bruneel et al. 2010), and grafting (Huber 
1991). 
In contrast to the real-time nature of experiential and vicarious learning, 
congenital learning refers to the learning by entrepreneurs toward the knowledge 
stocks and past experience they brought into the venture at founding (Huber 1991). 
Past research has discovered that previous actions and their outcomes are retained 
in the memory of the founders, leading to interpretations and generalizations that 
can be drawn upon in decision making (Kim 1993). Entrepreneurial researchers 
have found that congenital learning plays a significant role in the superior 
performance of ventures, especially the spin-outs (e.g., Agarwal et al. 2002; 
Cegarra-Navarro and Wensley 2009). Empirical studies have also found that 
founders’ international experience acquired before starting the venture can 
facilitate the internationalization process of the venture (Bruneel et al. 2010; 
Oviatt and McDougall 1994; Sapienza et al. 2006).   
Grafting is defined as the introduction of new members with distinctive 
knowledge that is not previously available within the venture (Huber 1991; Lyle 
1988). Prior entrepreneurship studies noted that the engagement of new 
entrepreneurial members with specialized knowledge from different functional 
departments could accelerate the operation of the venture, which ensures the 
success of market competition (Clarysse and Moray 2004). Prior studies also 
suggested that the involvement of new members with abundant knowledge in 
diverse business domains could revive the knowledge pools of the venture and 
lead to innovative products/services through creative combinations (Forbes et al. 
2006).  
The different types of learning discussed above could offer valuable 
theoretical references for the research on the learning behaviors by individual 
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entrepreneurial team members, since the entrepreneurial team members, as 
individuals on their own, could as well learn from their past experience or other 
organizations’ experience, as well as learning from the feedbacks of their real-
time venture performance outcomes. However, learning by entrepreneurial team 
incorporates both the internal and external communication processes that are 
central to the team’s actions and behaviors (Clarysse and Moray 2004). All the 
learning behaviors discussed above fall into the external communication 
processes by individual entrepreneurial team members with their external 
environments. The internal communication (i.e., collective learning) among the 
team members are of equal, if not more, important (Wang and Chugh 2013). 
Entrepreneurial team’s collective learning refers to the “social process of 
cumulative knowledge, based on a set of shared rules and procedures which allow 
individuals to coordinate their actions in search for problem solutions” (Capello 
1999, p. 354). According to Karatas -¸Özkan (2011), entrepreneurial team 
members develop ‘a feel for the game’, understanding their own strengths and 
weaknesses and adjusting their roles in the new venture. Literatures on the 
communication and social integration in entrepreneurial teams provide several 
theoretical insights to understand thiscollective learning process by 
entrepreneurial teams (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990; Jones and Macpherson 
2006; Keck 1997; Vyakarnam and Handelberg 2005).  
Communication concerns the amount of interaction among entrepreneurial 
team members, be it face-to-face, telephone, written notes, or electronic mail 
(Daft and Lengel 1984). Communication among entrepreneurial team members 
allows them to achieve shared strategic cognitions through the functional 
cognitive conflicts (Ensley et al. 2002). For example, Ensley and Pearce (2001) 
found that cognitive conflict enhance firm performance in two samples of new 
venture entrepreneurial teams. Later, Talaulicar et al. (2005) developed this idea 
by suggesting that higher level of task debate among team members contributed to 
more comprehensive decision making, which in turn fosters the team 
effectiveness (Chowdhury 2005). 
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However, the cognitive conflicts engendered by communication among 
entrepreneurial team members might arouse interpersonal disagreements and 
trigger affective conflicts that are detrimental to venture performance (Ensley et al. 
2002; Knight et al. 1999). Hence, researchers suggest that communications must 
be complemented by necessary social integrations among the team members 
which reduce the dysfunctional affective conflicts through the enhancement of 
team cohesion (Reuber and Fischer (2002). For example, Ensley et al. (2002) 
surveyed entrepreneurial teams of 70 new ventures and found that affective 
cohesion among entrepreneurial team members could enhance new venture 
performance. Reuber and Fischer (2002) developed this idea by arguing that 
behavioral integration within small-to-medium-size enterprise (SME)’s 
entrepreneurial team positively moderated the link between foreign sale growth 
and overall firm growth. As an integration of these two team processes, Foo et al. 
(2006) proposed that intra-team processes of social integration and open 
communication could enhance team viability and member satisfaction in 51 
entrepreneurial teams. 
Taken as a whole, although entrepreneurial learning by venture teams has 
been empirically found to associate with superior venture performance (Chandler 
and Lyon 2009), existing literature still lacks a systemic examination of the 
entrepreneurial team’s learning behaviors. And it is still unclear how 
entrepreneurial team learning interacts with other team issues both internal and 
external to the team in determining the venture growth (Wang and Chugh 2013). 




Table 6 Selected Studies on Entrepreneurial Learning 







Sapienza et al. 
2006 
Theoretical/Conceptual Development Organizational 
survival 
Organizational age, managerial experience, and 
resource fungibility moderate the direct effects of 
internationalization on venture survival and growth.  
Congenital  
Bruneel et al. 
2010 
Empirical: Quantitative survey of 114 




A firm’s level of international experience negatively 
moderates the effects of congenital and inter-





Politis 2005 Literature review and theoretical 
development 
Experiential learning A conceptual framework is developed for the process 




Empirical: Qualitative longitudinal case 
study of a research-based spin-off in 
Belgium 
Experiential learning Learning by doing is essential for the team to 
understand the need for external formal leadership. 
Collective team learning seems to precede individual 





Empirical: Qualitative study based on 




Various kinds of learning are identified in the SMEs: 
experiential learning, external learning, learning by 
doing, routine adaptation (internal search), trial and 









Heuristics are consequential in explaining variations in 
experiential and vicarious learning. 
In some cases, heuristics can be highly adaptive and 
beneficial to the accumulation of knowledge. In 






Empirical: Qualitative case study on 




Learning from inter-organizational relationships 
requires owner-managers to be proactive in accessing 
and extending appropriate inter-organizational 
relationships. 
External organizations can play an active role by 
‘intertwining’ knowledge to support the development 




institutionalize learning throughout the organization. 
Forbes et al. 
2006 
Theoretical/Conceptual Development 




Resource seeking and interpersonal attraction are two 





Empirical: Qualitative single case study 







The author develops a multi-layered relational 
framework of entrepreneurial learning which 
transcends individual-, team-, firm- and network-level 
analyses of the subject by generating insights from 




Empirical: Mail survey of two samples 
(88 ventures and 70 ventures) who were 
members of the 1994 and 1995 inc. 500 
Models of shared 
cognition 
Group cohesion is negatively related to cognitive 
conflict, which in turn, positively relates to venture 
performance. 
Collective 
Ensley et al. 
2002 
Empirical: Qualitative survey of 70 new 
ventures who were members of the 1995 
Inc. 500 
Group Theory; Upper 
echelon perspective 
Cohesion among entrepreneurial team members is 
positively related to new venture performance. 
Collective 
Foo et al. 2006 Empirical: Field study combining web 
survey and telephone interviews of 56 




Open communication and social integration among 
entrepreneurial team members increase team viability 




Empirical: Qualitative survey of 90 
ventures in software products industry 
and 97 ventures in food processing 
industry in Canada 
Upper echelon 
perspective 
Behavioral integration within small firms’ 
entrepreneurial teams positively moderates the 





Empirical: Quantitative survey of 56 
start-up companies in German 
specializing in providing high-
technology-based products 
Theory of decision 
making 
Higher level of debate contributed to more 
comprehensive decision making. However, debate 




2.1.4 Entrepreneurial Team Turnover 
A key aspect of team turnover is the change of team memberships. 
Entrepreneurial team researchers have primarily focused on discovering 
motivators for the membership changes. For example, Boeker and Wiltbank (2005) 
found that changes in entrepreneurial teams occur in cases of very high and very 
low firm growth, but are reduced by a functionally diverse entrepreneurial team. 
They also found that venture capital ownership and board representation increase 
the changes, while managerial ownership decreases them. However, researchers 
noted that there are two types of team membership change (i.e., team member 
entry and team member exit) and these two types have different motivators (e.g., 
Chandler et al. 2005; Forbes et al. 2006; Ucbasaran et al. 2003). Guided by this 
notion, entrepreneurial team researchers have adopted literature of top 
management team and employee turnover to identify and examine the antecedents 
for entrepreneurial team member entry and exit.  
In terms of the antecedents for team member entry, results are mixed and 
sometimes conflicting. Adopting theories from human capital, upper echelon and 
strategic decision-making, Chandler et al. (2005) found that initial team size, 
environmental dynamism, team heterogeneity in terms of education, industry 
tenure, and functional specialization are positively related to team member 
additions. In contrast, Ucbasaran et al. (2003) discovered that size of founding 
team is negatively associated with subsequent member addition, although they 
also found that functional heterogeneity positively relate to member entry. 
Different from these two groups of researchers, Forbes et al. (2006) proposed the 
resource seeking and interpersonal attraction as two additional motivators for new 
team member additions. From a social capability perspective, Brinckmann and 
Hoegl (2011) found that relational capabilities (i.e., collaborations of team 
member with partners external to the firm) lead to founding team member 
additions while teamwork capabilities (i.e., collaboration quality among team 
members) reduce the team member additions.  
With regard to team member exit, there are also a range of motivators 
identified by entrepreneurship researchers (e.g., Boeker and Karichalil 2002). For 
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instance, Ucbasaran et al. (2003) found that heterogeneity in prior entrepreneurial 
experience may motivate members to exit, while family ties among members 
could reduce member withdrawals. Chandler et al. (2005) added to their results 
and suggested that large initial team size and heterogeneity in industry tenure and 
religious affiliation are also triggers for team member departures.  
Apart from the exploration of antecedents for team turnover, a relatively 
few studies have started to examine the performance implications of team 
turnover (e.g., Beckman et al. 2007; Chandler et al. 2005; DeTienne 2010). A 
shared consensus of these studies is that benign team turnover is critical for a 
venture to achieve its critical milestones (DeTienne 2010). For instance, the exits 
of founders have been found to enable the infusion of specific management skills, 
the attraction of more cash investments (Boeker and Wiltbank 2005), the 
expansion to other product areas (Aldrich 1999), and the increase in legitimacy 
(DeTienne 2010), which in turn enhance venture performance. Developing this 
logic, Beckman et al. (2007) found that entrants to and founder exits from the 
entrepreneurial team increase the likelihood of venture IPO, while exits by 
latterly-added members reduce this likelihood. However, some other scholars 
suggest that the founder successions may disrupt work routines, increase 
employee insecurity (Haveman and Khaire 2004), and increase organization 
mortality (Carroll 1984; Haveman 1993). As a reconciliation of these two 
contradictory findings, Chandler et al. (2005) suggested that the benefits of 
adding and dropping team members are contingent on the venture development 
stage and environmental dynamism.  
 
2.1.5 Venture Strategy and Market Contexts of Entrepreneurial Team 
Past literature on entrepreneurial teams has heavily dwelled on the intra-
team organizing structures and interaction patterns among the team members 
when studying the development of the team and its implications for team and 
venture performance (e.g., Chowdhury 2005; Ensley and Hmieleski 2005; Ensley 
and Pearson 2005; Foo et al. 2006; Knockaert et al. 2011; Packalen 2007; Watson 
et al. 2003). However, combining the upper echelon and the contingency 
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perspective, researchers have admitted that the entrepreneurial team structures 
must fit with their venture strategies to fully release the potency of the teams. 
Different venture development stages have unique strategies that require 
distinctive social capitals and managerial capabilities from the entrepreneurial 
teams, thereby prompting the teams to constantly change their structures and 
compositions to line up with the strategic requirements (e.g., Boeker and 
Wiltbank 2005; Clarysse and Moray 2004; Flamholtz and Randle 2000; Vanaelst 
et al. 2006). For example, Beckman (2006) proposed that entrepreneurial teams 
with diverse prior company affiliations are effective for exploratory firm 
strategies, while teams with common prior affiliations are more germane to 
exploitative firm strategies. In a similar vein, Amason et al. (2006) suggest that 
homogeneous entrepreneurial teams have smooth interactions and thus are more 
appropriate for pursuing innovate (i.e., learn-by-doing) strategies, while 
heterogeneous teams have access to broader networks and would be more 
effective for imitative (i.e., learn-by-watching) strategies. More recently, 
Ganotakis and Love (2012) discovered that commercial and managerial 
experiences of the entrepreneurial teams help the firms become exporters, but it is 
the general and specific education of the entrepreneurial teams that make the 
entrepreneurial firms successful exporters. Fern et al. (2012) also suggested that 
diversity of experience at the entrepreneurial team level could lessen the 
constraints on strategy choices of the venture.  
However, since entrepreneurial teams are not operated in isolation to their 
external environments (Birley and Stockley 2000), it is believed that the 
immediate external contexts in which entrepreneurial teams are operated could 
have important and un-ignorable impacts for the venture strategies and their 
compatible team structures (Hellerstedt 2009). Some researchers suggest that 
strategies are “constructed, molded, and adapted in processes of interaction with 
environments” (Aldrich and Martinez 2001, p. 52), thus the venture strategies 
must constantly fit with the market or industry environments so as to enhance 
venture success. Hence, a critical determinant for the effectiveness of team 
structure is the market or industry environment surrounding the venture. Murray 
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(2003) hypothesized that homogeneous entrepreneurial teams were better off 
when there was intense market competition, while heterogeneous teams were 
more suitable and flexible under conditions when the environment changes 
rapidly. Hmieleski and Ensley (2007) suggested that in dynamic industry 
environment, heterogeneous teams should be led by directive leaders while 
homogeneous teams should be monitored by empowering leaders. But in stable 
industry environment, the best configurations should just be the opposite. Taken 
together, prior studies have both theoretically and empirically pointed out that the 
contextual influences cannot be overlooked when researchers examine the 
relationships between entrepreneurial team and venture performance. 
 
2.1.6 Entrepreneurial Team Performance 
The performance outcomes of entrepreneurial teams have long been 
studied at the firm level. A vast range of firm economic performance indicators 
have been examined, such as return on assets, return on equity, return on sales, 
gross sales, net cash flows, and revenue growth rate (e.g., Daily et al. 2002; 
Ensley and Hmieleski 2005). Most of the studies linking team structures to 
venture performance outcomes are based on the upper echelon perspective 
(Hambrick 1984). However, as aforementioned, the upper echelon perspective has 
been criticized for its ignorance of the underlying process and dynamics for the 
teams to affect the performance (Carpenter et al. 2004; Lawrence 1997). And the 
contextual factors should also be included into the discussion of team 
effectiveness (Vyakarnam and Handelberg 2005).  
Apart from the effects of entrepreneurial team on venture performance, 
another interesting but seldom studied issue is the reverse effect of venture 
performance on team structures or dynamics (Cooper and Daily 1997). The 
economic performance of the firm could have a reasonable effect on subsequent 
changes in the top management teams (Matlay and Westhead 2005; Napier and 
Gershenfeld 2004). Entrepreneurial teams have the potentials of learning during 
the process of constructing their ventures, based on feedback from their venture 
performance outcomes (Aldrich and Martinez 2001). In view of that, a few 
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entrepreneurial team researchers have noticed this feedback effect in their studies. 
For example, Boeker and Wiltbank (2005) suggest that entrepreneurial team 
changes occur in situations of very high and very low firm growth. Fiet et al. 
(1997) discover that low performance will motivate the dismissal of the new 
venture team members. Hellerstedt and Aldrich (2008) find that negative initial 
venture performance will arouse members’ exit behaviors. However, our 
understanding about these potential feedback loops is still limited since most 
existing studies relying on cross-sectional approaches are incapable of examining 
this effect.  
 
2.2 Entrepreneurial Lifecycle and The Evolutionary Theory of Firm 
The above literature seems to be overwhelmed by a static view towards 
the entrepreneurial team. Even some researchers adopt a contingent perspective 
and try to bring in various moderators to the literature (e.g., Hmieleski and Ensley 
2007; Ensley et al. 2006), limited by the quantitative nature of their research data, 
they are at best merely proposing a configurational outlook, rather than a purely 
dynamic view.  
In their seminal article on the future challenges for entrepreneurship 
research, Low and MacMillan (1988) called for the development of more rigorous 
models of the entrepreneurial process, the need to conduct more causality and 
theory-driven research and the values of research with a more contextual and 
process-oriented focus. Entrepreneurship researchers following this call have 
strived to examine the entrepreneurship from a dynamic perspective. Some 
entrepreneurship researchers apply the organizational lifecycle theory to the 
development of entrepreneurial firms and introduce the notion of entrepreneurial 
lifecycle (e.g., Hill et al. 2002; McAdam and McAdam 2008; Parker 2006).  
Researchers in this line try to identify or demystify different stages/phases of the 
entrepreneurial firm lifecycle, starting from the creation and evaluation of 
business ideas through the preparation for establishing a new venture, toward the 
legal establishment and growth of a nascent venture; and finally to the maturity or 
death of the venture. In general, four overarching phases are revealed by the past 
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studies, each with their own major tasks and goals (see Table 7). There are 
different definitions and labels provided by scholars for each development stage.  
Table 7. Four Phases of Entrepreneurial Firm Lifecycle 
Phase Major tasks and goals 
Idea phase Generation and screening of idea (Brockner et al. 2004);  
Conception (Cardon et al. 2005; Reynolds and White 1997) 
Research and opportunity framing (Vohora et al. 2004) 
Research commercialization and opportunity screening (Vanaelst et al. 2006) 
Pre-start-up phase Procuring necessary resources, providing the business model (Brockner et al. 
2004) 
Organization in gestation (Cardon et al. 2005; Reynolds and White 1997; 
Vanaelst et al. 2006 ) 
Pre-organization (Vohora et al. 2004) 
Start-up phase Rollout (Brockner et al. 2004) 
Infancy (Cardon et al. 2005) 
Emergence (Hite and Hesterly 2001) 
Survival (Maurer and Ebers 2006) 
Fledging new firms (Reynolds and White 1997) 
Proof of viability (Vanaelst et al. 2006) 
Re-orientation (Vohora et al. 2004) 
Post-start-up 
phase 
Maturity, renewal, growth and decline (Brockner et al. 2004; Vanaelst et al. 
2006) 
Toddlerhood, childhood, growth, maturity (Cardon et al. 2005) 
Early growth, later growth, maturity, death (Hite and Hesterly 2001) 
Established new firms (Reynolds and White 1997) 
Sustainable return (Vohora et al. 2004) 
As seen from the table, there are generally four development phases in 
entrepreneurial firm’s lifecycle. During the idea phase, the major tasks for 
entrepreneurs are to discover and evaluate new business opportunities. 
Entrepreneurs try to commercialize their research into profitable business ideas 
and screen out those ideas which are not viable (Vanaelst et al. 2006; Vohora et al. 
2004). After framing the appropriate opportunities, entrepreneurs primarily focus 
on planning and preparation for the establishment of new ventures to pursue these 
opportunities in the pre-start-up phase. Resources necessary for opportunity 
exploitation are gathered, and the business models for new ventures are delineated 
during this phase (Brockner et al. 2004). Then at the start-up phase, the nascent 
venture is formally and legally established. The whole entrepreneurial team works 
to strengthen the viability of the business and secure first round funding for 
survival (Hite and Hesterly 2001; Maurer and Ebers 2006). Finally, when the 
venture passes the start-up phase, the entrepreneurial team works to sustain their 
returns to develop and grow the business. And the venture may go through early 
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growth, later growth, maturity and death (Hite and Hesterly 2001). Within the 
four phases, the start-up phase and post-start-up phase are the ones in which the 
entrepreneurial teams’ structures and roles are more formalized and defined and 
the venture strategies are more clearly articulated (Clarysse and Moray 2004; 
Shalley and Perry-Smith 2008). Nevertheless, regardless of different definitions 
and labels of entrepreneurial development phases, a shared understanding held by 
these entrepreneurial lifecycle researchers is that each development stage of the 
venture has unique strategic goals and resource needs (Hite and Hesterly 2001) 
and thus entrepreneurs must overcome their resource challenges at each stage so 
as to survive and grow (Bhide 1999; Partanen et al. 2008).  
In parallel with this entrepreneurial lifecycle perspective, entrepreneurship 
scholars have also borrowed other theories to explain the dynamic development of 
entrepreneurial firm along its lifecycle. One of the most popular theoretical lenses 
is the evolutionary theory of firm (Nelson and Winter 1982). Evolutionary theory 
of firm is established by scholarly efforts to introducing Darwin (1859)’s 
evolutionary theory in biology discipline to the context of organization. Darwin 
(1859)’s evolutionary theory focuses on the evolutionary processes of organisms 
in a species. The basic tenets of Darwin (1859)’s evolutionary theory is that: 
variability exists in the inheritable traits possessed by individual organisms of a 
species. When this variability results in differences in the ability of each organism 
to reproduce in their environment, those traits that improve reproductive ability 
will become dominant in the species. Three primary principles operating in the 
Darwin’s evolutionary theory are variation (of genotypes), selection (of the 
consequent phenotypes according to their fitness in the environment), and 
retention (of underlying genotype) (Hodgson 2003). Applying the evolutionary 
theory to the context of mundane organizations, Nelson and Winter (1982) 
proposed the evolutionary theory of firm. The basic arguments they have are: 
firms are established with different endowments and are motivated by profits and 
engage in search for ways to improve their profits in changing markets. Firms’ 
capabilities and decision rules are modified by deliberate problem-solving efforts 
and random events. This kind of natural selection operates as the market 
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determines which firms are profitable and which are unprofitable, and tends to 
winnow out the latter. Nelson and Winter (1985)’s evolutionary theory of firm not 
only fully represents the three principles of Darwin’s evolutionary theory, but also 
further develops the evolutionary theory by highlighting a fourth principle: the 
adaptation  (of genotypes). 
Entrepreneurship researchers applying the evolutionary theory of firm to 
the study of nascent entrepreneurial firms have suggested that all the four basic 
principles (variation, adaptation, selection and retention) are indispensible to 
reach a coherent understanding of the evolution of entrepreneurial firm (Aldrich 
1999). According to Aldrich and Martinez (2001, p. 42), an evolutionary 
approach towards the entrepreneurial firms examines “the creation of new 
organizational structures (variation), the way in which entrepreneurs modify their 
organizations and use resources to survive in changing environments (adaptation), 
the circumstances under which such organizational arrangements lead to success 
and survival (selection), and the way in which successful arrangements tend to be 
imitated and perpetuated by other entrepreneurs (retention)”. Bearing these 
evolutionary logics in mind, entrepreneurship researchers have generated a 
number of valuable insights. For example, Hite and Hesterly (2001) found that as 
new firms evolve from emergence stage to early growth stage, their networks shift 
from identity-based to more calculative ones. Similarly, Hite (2005) focused on 
the evolutionary processes and paths of relationally embedded network ties of 
emerging firms and suggested that such ties entering the network through 
personal relationship may evolve faster toward full embeddedness. Ahlstrom and 
Bruton (2010) conducted a longitudinal study of high technology entrepreneurial 
firms in Russia and examine how entrepreneurial ventures co-evolve with rapid 
institutional changes and manage to prosper. Grebel et al. (2003) established an 
economic model for the entrepreneurial behavior and used simulation techniques 
to test the model. They found that venture’s survivability is determined by its 
founders’ endowments and its competitiveness, rather than the evaluations and 




2.3 Applicability of Evolutionary Theory to Entrepreneurial Team Research 
Aside from the adoption of evolutionary theory to the development of 
entrepreneurial firms, some recent entrepreneurship researchers have started to 
apply an evolutionary approach towards the entrepreneurial team (e.g., Clarysse 
and Moray 2004; Rasmussen et al. 2011). The application of evolutionary theory 
to the examination of entrepreneurial teams is rationalized by several reasons. 
First, entrepreneurial teams are viewed by some scholars as self-organizing 
entities exposing to the shocks in external environments (Clarysse and Moray 
2004). Different from top management teams or project teams in large 
organizations which are formed and operating under the interventions and 
directions of external parties, entrepreneurial teams in nascent ventures are 
typically formed because of the voluntary entrepreneurial intentions of the team 
members. This outlook corroborates with the primary assumption of evolutionary 
theory that organisms in a species are self-organizing and trying to adapt to their 
external environment. Second, as entrepreneurial teams are typically voluntarily 
formed, they may manifest a greater variance in terms of founding resources and 
structures, which provides good opportunity for the examination of the variance 
principle in evolutionary theory. Third, entrepreneurial teams frequently search 
for best practices from their surrounding environments and constantly learn from 
their own past experience and other’s experience, which goes in parallel with the 
retention discourse in evolutionary theory where appropriate traits or 
arrangements are likely to imitated or perpetuated. Taken together, the 
evolutionary theory works as an effective theoretical weapon to frame the 
development processes of entrepreneurial teams along their ventures’ lifecycle. 
Entrepreneurial team researchers have generated different and sometimes 
contradictory insights when applying different principles of the evolutionary 
theory. Applying the variation and selection principles, researchers have primarily 
adopted a resource-based perspective (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990) to 
highlight the imprinting effect of entrepreneurial team’s founding resource and 
structure on team evolution. They based on the notions of homophily (Ruef et al. 
2003), imprinting (Burton and Beckman 2007), path-dependence (Beckman and 
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Burton 2008) and inertia (Phillips 2005) to opine that founders could bring in 
critical experiences and make critical strategic choices early in the venture’s 
history, which leaves a lasting organizational imprint, even after the founders exit 
(Beckman and Burton 2008). They argue that the subsequent executives and team 
structures bear a strong resemblance to the founding executives and structures 
(Beckman and Burton 2008). Thus, they suggest that entrepreneurial teams would 
be more viable by starting with a large number of broadly experienced team 
members and drop those that do not fit or make meaningful contributions (e.g., 
Chandler et al. 2005). For example, Heirman and Clarysse (2005) surveyed 205 
research-based start-ups in Belgium and discovered that ventures with founding 
teams having commercial experience grow more significantly than those founded 
by pure technical teams. Similarly, Beckman and Burton (2008) suggested that 
ventures founded by broadly experienced team members would build more 
complete functional structures, which allows them to attract functional experts 
and achieve critical milestones faster than those with neither experienced team 
nor complete structures. These studies all promote that managerial professionals 
and industry experts must be presented in the team early from the start. 
However, in contrast to the imprinting perspective, some entrepreneurial team 
researchers rely on the adaptation and retention principles and emphasize the 
adaptation and learning by entrepreneurial teams (Boeker and Wiltbank 2005; 
Karatas-Ozkan 2011). They suggested that the demands for entrepreneurial teams 
may differ at different stages (Birley and Stockley 2000). Hence, entrepreneurial 
team’s structure must be constantly adjusted to meet the strategic needs and 
managerial demands at different stages of the venture development (e.g., Clarysse 
and Moray 2004; Vanaelst et al. 2006; Vohora et al. 2004). They opine that 
successful start-ups are more proactive in adapting their team structures. For 
instance, successful entrepreneurial teams tend to frequently engage new 
managers with more professional experiences, whereas less successful ones are 
more likely to leave the set of founding managers essentially unchanged (e.g., 
Gupta 1996; Hambrick and Crozier 1985). The inclusion of new team members 
with rich managerial and professional experiences could strengthen the 
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managerial capabilities of the entrepreneurial teams which foster the rapid 
development and growth of the venture (Boeker and Karachalil 2002; Hellman 
and Puri 2002; Jayaraman et al. 2000). Moreover, engagement of new team 
members with distinctive social and relational capitals external to the existing 
teams allow the entrepreneurial firms to get access to abundant novel strategic 
resources that are otherwise unattainable (Forbes et al. 2006), thereby injecting 
new competitive advantages to the ventures. They generally consider 
entrepreneurial teams as being started by a small group of specialized technical 
wizards exploiting the new market opportunities and establishing a company 
(usually in a garage), subsequently attracts more broadly experienced executives 
into the team as the venture outgrows the managerial capabilities of the technical 
founders, a process usually termed as “professionalization” (Audia and Rider 
2005; Boeker and Karachalil 2002; Hellman and Puri 2002; Vanaelst et al. 2006). 
For example, Clarysse and Moray (2004) depicts the entrepreneurial team 
evolution in research-based spin-offs into three distinct phases. During the pre-
founding phase, where the primary activity is to determine the market viability of 
the business, the team is principally made up of technical geniuses. In the start-up 
phase, the firm is formally established and the roles of team members become 
more formalized and other content experts may join the team. Then in the post-
start-up phase, the processes, roles, and structures have become more defined as 
the team works to grow the business, as a result new managerial experts join the 
team and technical founders may exit. Their basic arguments are that 
technological champions or founders usually do not make good managers; 
therefore the technical founders must be replaced or supplemented by professional 
managers to avoid the stagnation of venture performance. In addition, they 
suggested that the entrepreneurial teams may need certain amount of time to 
collectively learn about this professionalization need. In a similar vein, Vanaelst 
et al. (2006) also found that researchers that actively participate in market 
opportunity identification at the first stage of the spin-out process usually do not 
have commitment to create the spinout and exit the team before the legal creation 
of the spinout. In line with Claysse and Moray (2004), they found that new team 
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members brought in different kinds of professional managerial experience, 
although they discovered that these newcomers do not bring in different view of 
doing business. Later, Rasmussen et al. (2011) more explicitly took a competency 
perspective to the entrepreneurial teams in university spin-offs and suggested that 
academic founding teams usually lack specific competencies to gain venture 
credibility. Therefore, academic founding teams had to either develop these 
competencies through learning from their experiences of dealing with partners 
and customers or acquiring them by gaining external champions from both 
internal and external to the university.  
 
2.4 Merits and Limitations: The IT Entrepreneurial Team as an Ideal 
Context to Develop the Evolutionary Theory of Firm 
The evolutionary theory of firm has two theoretical contributions for the 
past entrepreneurship literature. First, evolutionary theory of firm integrates the 
entrepreneurial processes, contexts, and outcomes in a single coherent framework 
based on four basic principles – variation, adaptation, selection and retention 
(Aldrich 1999). The four basic principles help entrepreneurship researchers 
examine the new venture from a dynamic angle. Second, evolutionary theory of 
firm allows for multi-level analysis of the new venture creation process, 
encompassing both the population level (population ecology) and the 
organizational level (strategic choice) and the interactions between both levels 
(Breslin 2008). Before the introduction of evolutionary theory of firm, there are 
two major research perspectives in entrepreneurship literature. One perspective is 
called the “environmental determinism”. Scholars adopting this perspective hold 
the assumption that organizations do not adapt to environmental change and that 
environmental selection is the determining factor. They use theories such as 
population ecology theory and institutional theory to explain the development of 
entrepreneurial firms (e.g., Baron et al. 1999; Kirzner 1997). The other 
perspective is termed the “strategic choice”. Researchers in this line hold the 
belief that organizational success lies in the decisions of the individual 
entrepreneurs who identify opportunities, develop strategies, assemble resources 
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and take initiatives. They adopt theories such as adaptation theory and 
organizational learning theory to frame the entrepreneurial firm development (e.g., 
Sarasvathy and Dew 2005; Ucbasaran et al. 2001). Evolutionary theory of firm, 
with its four basic principles, holistically integrates these two perspectives into a 
coherent theoretical framework.  
However, there are also limitations in the evolutionary theory of firm, 
which could be addressed by applying this theory to the context of IT 
entrepreneurial team. First, the scope or content of learning in the evolutionary 
theory is rather limited, partly due to the difficulties of researchers in analyzing 
and gauging the learning processes of the whole entrepreneurial firm. The basic 
retention principle in this theory merely incorporates two types of learning: 
vicarious learning and congenital learning. However, as presented in section 2.1 
above, there are other types of learning discovered by past scholars such as 
experiential learning, grafting, and collective learning. These types of learning 
may be more observable in the entrepreneurial teams, whereby entrepreneurial 
teams have been found to engage in various types of learning (e.g., Clarysse and 
Moray 2004; Hayton and Zahra 2005; Rasmussen et al. 2011). Hence, applying 
the evolutionary theory of firm to the entrepreneurial team context provides the 
opportunity to examine various types of learning. Second, the evolutionary theory 
of firm implicitly assumes a linear progression path for the entrepreneurial firms. 
However, a critical element is missing, that is, the speed of evolution. 
Evolutionary theory of firm proposes that entrepreneurial firms which adapt to 
changing environments could survive and grow, while those do not adapt would 
perish and diminish. However, the efficiency aspect of such adaptation process is 
lost. Some entrepreneurial firms may be more agile when adapting to 
environmental changes, while other entrepreneurial firms may be slow in their 
response to adaptation. This kind of organizational agility in adaptation 
differentiates entrepreneurial firms which could stay competitive from those 
which do not. For entrepreneurial teams operating in the dynamic IT industry, 
whether they can quickly adapt their structures to execute new strategies in new 
market contexts is especially crucial for the survival and growth of their ventures. 
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The constant adaptation process in some IT entrepreneurial teams may be 
accelerated, while postponed or even abandoned in some others. Hence, exploring 
the reasons for different efficiencies in the adaptation processes by IT 
entrepreneurial teams could enrich the evolutionary theory of firm with the 
efficiency element of evolution. I propose that the two streams of research (i.e., 
imprinting and learning) in the entrepreneurial team literature are both 
theoretically sound and complement with each other in explaining the speed of 
entrepreneurial team evolution. On one hand, the imprinting perspective 
complements the learning perspective in a way that it offers some theoretical 
explanations for why the learning processes are enabled and accelerated in some 
teams while postponed or even abandoned in some others. The resources of 
founding entrepreneurial teams may either facilitate or constrain their abilities to 
adapt their team structures to the changing strategic needs at different 
development stages. Past literature studying the adaptation of entrepreneurial 
teams in the academic spin-off context (e.g., Clarysse and Moray 2004; 
Rasmussen et al. 2011; Vanaelst et al. 2006; Vohora et al. 2004) is unable to 
examine how the founding team’s different resources influence the learning and 
adaptation process of the team, since the academic founders typically possess 
narrowed resources. It has been found in other contexts that social capital 
possessed by entrepreneurial founders allows them to attract new members to the 
teams (Forbes et al. 2006; Stam and Elfring 2008). Founders’ previous experience 
may influence their exit intentions (DeTienne and Cardon 2007). And the equity 
and psychological ownership of the founders may determine whether they 
develop exit strategies (DeTienne 2010).  
On the other hand, the learning perspective complements the imprinting 
perspective by highlighting the role of learning in altering and transforming the 
founding resources. As the venture evolves, the entrepreneurial teams may 
identify deficiencies in their structures through experiential learning (e.g., Corbett 
2005; Politis 2005) or inter-organizational learning (Jones and Macpherson 2006), 
which prompts them to strategically adjust their structures to meet with the 
changing strategic needs. Past literature has indicated the possibility for 
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entrepreneurial teams to learn from their own experience or experience of other 
firms to transform themselves (e.g., Clarysse and Moray 2004; Karatas-Ozkan 
2011). Entrepreneurial teams may develop managerial competencies through the 
learning from their own real-time venture operation experiences or the strategic 
acquisition of managerial expertise when the needs arise (Rasmussen et al. 2011). 
Taken together, the entrepreneurial team’s founding resources interplay with the 
team’s learning processes to influence the adaptation and evolution speed of the 
entrepreneurial teams. 
Past literature has empirically justified that entrepreneurial teams which 
adapt to the changing environments can survive and grow. However, the literature 
does not address the efficiency issue in such adaptation. As discussed above, the 
integration of the imprinting perspective and learning perspective in 
entrepreneurial team research yields the opportunity to fill this gap and advance 
the evolutionary theory of firm. Hence, it is imperative to apply the evolutionary 
theory of firm and its four basic principles to the examination of IT 
entrepreneurial team evolution. A clear understanding of the IT entrepreneurial 
team evolution along entrepreneurial lifecycle requires a detailed analysis of the 
variations in team structures, the adaptation processes by entrepreneurial teams on 
their structures in the changing environments, the selection of appropriate 
structures by the venture performance, and the role of team resources and learning 
processes in determining the efficiency of structural adaptation by IT 












CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Research Design 
As aforementioned, the second step of theory contextualization is testing 
the basic tenets of the established theory in the new context. To achieve that, I 
conducted a longitudinal qualitative multiple-case study (Eisenhardt 1989) and 
collect empirical data to verify the applicability of evolutionary theory of firm in 
the context of IT entrepreneurial teams. There are three reasons for the adoption 
of this research approach. First, my primary research questions are to examine 
how IT entrepreneurial teams dynamically change and develop over time during 
their early stages and why some structural adaptations are accelerated while 
others are postponed. Such “how” and “why” questions are better explored 
through qualitative case studies that can better develop a holistic understanding of 
real-life events (Yin 2003). Second, as the development and evolution of IT 
entrepreneurial teams are extremely complicated and involved a huge number of 
causal events proceeding over time, it cannot be fully represented by a cross-
sectional design. A longitudinal approach is thus warranted to capture the changes 
and events over time and reduce the retrospective biases (Pettigrew 1990). Third, 
the use of multiple-case method is appropriate to gain insights into such dynamic 
phenomena (Eisenhardt 1989) and could also enhance the generalizability of the 
findings, while maintaining a fair degree of details (Graebner 2009). For the 
whole case study, I follow the processes suggested by Eisenhardt (1989) in her 
seminal article of “Building Theories from Case Study Research” and go through 
eight steps to generate a contextualized theory from the six cases (refer to 
Appendix 1 for the Process of Building Theory from Case Study Research by 
Eisenhardt (1989)). 
 
3.2 Case Selection 
The setting of my research is the IT industry, in which entrepreneurial 
firms develop IT products or IT services to generate revenues for various 
customer segments. This setting was appropriate for several reasons. First, 
studying a single industry enables more valid comparison of ventures (Hallen and 
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Eisenhardt 2012). Second, IT industry is characterized by relatively higher market 
uncertainty (Anderson et al. 2000; Mendelson 2000) and greater market 
competition (Kim et al. 2000), as compared to traditional industries such as 
manufacturing or automobile industry. Thus, there may be a greater variance in 
terms of market contexts and venture strategies among different entrepreneurial 
teams or among different development stages of the same entrepreneurial team. 
Such variance increases the likelihood of diverse evolutionary paths among 
different IT entrepreneurial teams. 
My sample was six IT entrepreneurial firms located in Zhongguancun Hi-
tech Park in Beijing, China. To enhance the validity of inferences of the research 
findings, I use some “natural controls” (Lee 1989) to ensure ‘controlled 
observations’ while selecting the cases. Natural controls rely on the selection of 
the phenomena during the study’s experimental design stage for their control, 
which allows particular factors (e.g., managerial policies, inventory systems) to be 
‘held constant’ while others (e.g., costs, defect rates) are left free to vary as they 
would naturally (Meredith 1998). For instance, the six cases I selected were all 
located in Zhongguancun Hi-tech Park of Beijing, China, and were all delivering 
IT products/services to domestic Chinese companies. Hence, there are enormous 
similarities in the broader cultural, social and institutional contexts surrounding 
these six IT entrepreneurial firms. In addition, the six case ventures were all 
operating in IT industry, thereby having the same industrial environment. 
Moreover, all the six ventures were established after the dot com bubble in year 
2000. The IT industry has not experienced drastic change or recession after Year 
2000, hence reducing the possibility that drastic environmental shocks/shifts may 
slow down or even change the path of entrepreneurial team evolution.  
Furthermore, to strengthen the generalizability of the research findings, I 
also adopt the theoretical sampling approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Eisenhardt 
1989) to select comparable cases from a specified population for this study. The 
use of theoretical sampling allows the research findings to reach a sufficient level 
of “analytic generalization” (Yin 2003). In contrast to random sampling, which is 
suitable for deductive research using statistical analysis, theoretical sampling is 
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purposefully nonrandom. Each case is chosen for theory-building reasons - that is, 
to illuminate the focal phenomenon and fill theoretical categories that enhance 
generalizability (Eisenhardt 1989). In keeping with my theoretical sampling 
approach, I chose IT ventures that are founded by at least two entrepreneurs who 
jointly share ownership and involve in strategic decision making. This enabled 
selection of ventures that evidenced the relevant phenomenon (i.e., IT 
entrepreneurial team). By contrast, it eliminated ventures that are founded by solo 
entrepreneurs. Although I selected ventures with at least two co-founders, the 
resulting sample has high variance in the size of entrepreneurial team (i.e., 
founding team size ranges from 2 to 7). This variation is useful for my aim of 
inducting accurate, parsimonious, and generalizable theory. Second, I chose IT 
entrepreneurial teams from both independent IT ventures and corporate IT spin-
offs, with the belief that entrepreneurial teams in corporate spin-offs, due to their 
access to resources and knowledge possessed by their parents, might manifest 
idiosyncratic evolution paths compared to the IT entrepreneurial teams in 
independent ventures (e.g., Clarysse et al. 2011; Knight 1989; Zahra et al. 2007). 
Third, I choose both IT product ventures as well as IT service ventures, with the 
beliefs that entrepreneurial teams in IT product ventures may experience different 
evolution pathway as compared to those in IT service firms, due to the inherent 
difference in the deliverables they generate). Including these two classifications of 
entrepreneurial firms (i.e., independent venture vs. corporate spin-off, IT product 
venture vs. IT service venture) in my study allowed exploration of the structural 
adaptation by entrepreneurial teams in a rich variety of contexts with likely 
variations in venture endowments, strategies and market contexts. 
At the time of my study, I only identified a small number of cases meeting 
the above selection criteria. After an initial contact with each case, where I 
presented my research objectives to them, I selected the cases where I managed to 
negotiate good access to collect information about the development processes of 
their entrepreneurial teams. In total, six IT entrepreneurial firms participate in the 
case study. Table 8 below provides descriptive characteristics of the resulting six 
IT entrepreneurial firms in this study. The six entrepreneurial firms all operate in 
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the IT industry, with three of them providing IT products and the other three 
providing IT services. Although they are located in Beijing, they serve local 
Chinese companies all around China or subsidiaries of foreign companies located 
in China. Their customers are all domestic customers. 
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Team Size (at 
founding) 
Entrepreneurial 





IT Product (Banking 
Supervision System) 
40 9 7 




IT Product (Smart phone and 
mobile/PDA industrial 
applications) 
60 6 2 




IT Product (RFID applications 
systems) 
30 10 3 dissolved 
Hitech 
IT Service (IT infrastructure 
operation services, 
Application development and 
deployment) 
490 8 6 




IT Service (BPO,ITO, IPR 
(Wifi, WLAN)) 
900 6 4 
9 members: 
6 managers; 3 
founders 
Wisdom 
IT Service (Internet social 
media website and media 
consulting services) 
95 6 2 
9 members: 
7 managers; 2 
founders 
                                                 
1
The primary investment channels for all the six IT entrepreneurial firms remained stable during their early stages. 
Softstone, Zion and Jupiter are funded by limited partnership. Broadline and Hitech are funded by their parent firms. 
Wisdom is funded by limited partnership and angle investors. 
2
As of April, 2013 
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3.3 Data Collection 
The primary source of the data was collected through in-depth onsite or 
telephone semi-structured interviews at regular intervals throughout a five-year 
period from October 2008. I made at least two rounds of interviews in all the six 
ventures. For each round, I typically contacted key members in the IT 
entrepreneurial teams to get an updated account of the development of the teams. 
In addition, to mitigate the subject bias (Miller et al. 1997), I also interviewed 
individuals from other levels in the ventures. For top management level (i.e., 
entrepreneurial team), I interviewed CEO, CFO, CTO and other C-level 
executives. For middle management level, I interviewed project managers, R&D 
managers, service managers, and other middle managers. And for operational 
level, I interviewed developers, sales person, software tester, and other 
operational staff. The decision of whom to interview in each round was informed 
by ongoing analysis which aims to gather additional perspectives on existing data 
as well as updates on recent events in each case. The second column of Table 9 
below shows the respondents’ roles and the number of interviews with each role.  
Table 9.  Data Sources of the Six Case Companies 
Company Interviews Archival Materials 
Softstone CEO (4); CFO (1); 




Company web pages 
Online news articles 
Zion CEO (4); 
Project manager (1); 
Sales person (1) 
Total: 6 
Marketing materials 
Company web pages 
Online news articles 
Jupiter CEO (3); 
R&D manager (1); 
Software tester (1) 
Total: 5 
Company handbook/reports 
Company web pages 
Hitech CEO (2); COO (1) 
Service manager (1); 
Service engineer (1) 
Total: 5 
Company handbook/reports 
Marketing materials  
Company web pages 
Online news articles 
Broadline CEO (3); CTO (1); 
Project manager (1); 
Developer (1) 
Total: 6 
Marketing materials  
Company web pages 
Wisdom CEO (3); VP (2); 
Project manager (1); 
Service engineer (1) 
Total: 7 
Marketing materials  
Company web pages 
Online news articles 
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The data collection ended when each venture had reached the credibility 
threshold and additional interviews mainly confirmed, rather than supplemented 
the existing data regarding the development of the entrepreneurial teams at their 
ventures’ early stages. A total of 36 interviews were conducted and each 
interview typically lasted between 60 and 120 minutes. Interviews were recorded 
and transcribed as part of the data analysis process.  
During the interviews, I asked probing questions to establish details. The 
interview protocol began with the personal background of the respondent, 
followed by some open-ended questions about their knowledge and understanding 
about the formation and development of their firms’ entrepreneurial teams. I 
focused on facts and events during the interview process to mitigate both 
cognitive biases and impression management of the respondents (Miller et al. 
1997). I promised confidentiality to make the informants comfortable in providing 
accurate data (Miller et al. 1997). I also reduced retrospective bias by 
triangulating the interview accounts with archival data (see the third column of 
Table 8) (Eisenhardt 1989), such as company handbooks/reports, marketing 
booklets/slides, company web pages, and articles on news websites reporting the 
change of venture’s entrepreneurial team (see Appendix 2 for selective examples 
of different archival data). Furthermore, I also conduct several nonparticipating 
on-site observations during the site visit (Eisenhardt 1989).  
 
3.4 Data Analysis 
All the data I gathered through the above various instruments were 
integrated and analyzed. As all the interviews were conducted in Chinese, and all 
the archival data collected are in Chinese. I employ the back translation approach 
(Brislin 1970) to ensure the validity of transcripts. I engage a bilingual person to 
first translate the Chinese version into English. I then engaged another bilingual 
translator (who was not aware of the original Chinese transcripts) to translate the 
English version back into Chinese. The two Chinese versions were then compared 
to ensure there was no significant difference in meanings. I discuss together with 
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the two translators to finalize the translated English version (Teo and Liu 2007). 
The final English transcripts totaled 650 double-spaced pages.  
For the data analysis, I went through the processes of data analysis 
suggested by Eisenhardt (1989). The data analysis starts with analyzing the 
within-case data. I built up detailed case write-ups for each individual case by 
synthesizing various data sources (Eisenhardt 1989). This process allows the 
unique patterns of each case to emerge before I push to generalize patterns across 
cases. Moreover, it provides me with a rich familiarity with each case which 
fosters cross-case comparison. Then I used these individual case write-ups for 
cross-case analysis. I try to search for patterns through cross-case comparison 
with the help of divergent techniques. There are three techniques suggested by 
Eisenhardt (1989) for such cross-case pattern searching. The first tactic is to select 
categories or dimensions, and then look for within-group similarities coupled with 
intergroup differences. Dimensions could be suggested by the research questions 
or by relevant literature. Within this process, I adopt the selective coding 
technique (Corbin and Strauss 1990) and try to identify concepts and themes that 
corroborate with extant literature (a sample of selective coding is shown in 
Appendix 3). In this study, the various dimensions of IT entrepreneurial team’s 
resources, structures, learning processes, venture strategies, market contexts, and 
the venture performance at the early stages of the ventures all emerged through 
such selective coding and cross-case pattern searching tactic. A second tactic is to 
select pairs of cases and then to list the similarities and differences between each 
pair. It allows me to look for the subtle similarities and divergences between 
cases. This forced comparison leads to new categories and concepts which I did 
not anticipate. In this study, the efficiency of structural adaptation was found 
through such paired comparison as a critical factor differentiating high- and low- 
performing ventures. The third tactic is to divide the data by data source and 
separately analyze different sources of data. The archival data collected through 
various means works as one source of data triangulating the narrative interview 
accounts. When evidence from different data source conflicts, I reconcile the 
evidence through deeper probing of the meaning of the differences, that is, I try to 
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find alternative explanations for such inconsistencies. This approach of dealing 
with inconsistencies helps to enhance the validity of the concepts emerged and 
sometimes, helps to mitigate spurious or random pattern, or biased thinking in the 
analysis. After the iterative process between within- and cross-case analyses, I go 
through the process of systematically compare the emerging theoretical 
framework with evidence from each case. This process is to verify the fit between 
the emerging constructs (and relationships between constructs) and the evidence 
in each case. After that, I compare the emergent theoretical framework with extant 
literature on entrepreneurial teams and evolutionary theory of firm to see which 
parts of the framework corroborate with extant literature, and which parts 
contradict and why. Following Eisenhardt (1989)’s suggestion, the data collection 
and data analysis is intertwined and this iterative process ends when theoretical 
saturation is reached (i.e., incremental learning of the phenomenon is minimal 
because the investigators are observing phenomena seen before) (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967). Taken together, through the use of the theory building processes 
suggested by Eisenhardt (1989), I am able to find promising elements for a 
contextualized theory that explain the evolutionary pathways of different IT 













CHAPTER 4 CASE DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 
In Chapter 4, I will provide detailed descriptions and analysis of the 
evolution of entrepreneurial teams in the six IT entrepreneurial firms. First, 
detailed descriptions for the creation and development of each entrepreneurial 
team are provided, with the support of some interview quotes and illustrative 
figures. This section 4.1 serves as the within-case analysis for this study. 
Dimensions and constructs that emerged from case evidence which corroborate 
with relevant literature are used to represent the evolutionary path of each IT 
entrepreneurial team. The dynamics of each IT entrepreneurial team are presented 
into three phases: team at founding, team at emergence stage, and team at early 
growth stage
3
. Descriptions of the configurations and changes in entrepreneurial 
team resources, structures, learning processes, venture strategy, market context 
and venture performance are also provided. After that, in section 4.2, the 
evolutionary paths of different IT entrepreneurial teams are analyzed and 
compared with the guidance of the four basic principles of evolutionary theory 
(i.e., variation, adaptation, selection, and retention), which serves as a cross-case 
analysis for this study. A coherent analysis of how the four basic principles work 
together in the evolutionary paths is offered, which leads to a process framework 
of IT entrepreneurial team evolution. The contributions of the findings of this 




                                                 
3
 Team at founding refers to the time point when the entrepreneurial firms are founded. The 
distinction between emergence stage and early growth stage after the legal creation of venture is 
naturally emerged from the case evidence and corroborates with the juxtaposition in a number of 
seminal classical papers in the entrepreneurship literature (e.g., Hite and Hersterly 2001; Maurer 
and Ebers 2006). The emergence stage starts from the legal creation of the venture until the time 
when the funds from the initial financing were nearly exhausted. The early growth stage begins 




Hite and Hersterly (2001) divided the early stages after the legal creation 
of the venture into two stages: emergence stage and early growth stage. The 
emergence stage began when the venture is legally created (Gartner and Brush 
1999; Hite and Hesterly 2001). During this stage, suffering from the liability of 
both newness and smallness (Katz and Gartner 1988), the strategic goal for 
entrepreneurial firm is organizational survival. To combat the newness and 
smallness, some ventures would try to quickly develop commercializable products 
for a targeted niche market to generate revenues as soon as possible, whereas 
some other ventures would operate in a mass market and strive to quickly occupy 
a large share of customers. The early growth stage begins when the firm 
intentionally grows beyond mere survival or sufficiency (Hite and Hesterly 2001). 
Compared to emerging firms, early growth firms may require much broader 
resources to grow their businesses, and their legitimacies are greater than the 
emerging firms. In this stage, those ventures which have developed matured 
deliverables at their emergence stage may try to market their deliverables to 
various customer segments in the niche markets, while those ventures which have 
occupied a large market share in their focal mass markets may experience market 
saturation, hence being prompted to diversify their business scope to identify new 
markets. The case evidences show that the six IT entrepreneurial teams (i.e., 
Softstone, Zion, Jupiter, Hitech, Broadline, and Wisdom) manifest idiosyncratic 
configurations at their founding and different early stages. Below I will present 
the case evidences regarding the creation and change of team structures for each 
IT entrepreneurial team, together with the evolution of the entrepreneurial firm in 
which it operates. This section serves as the with-in case analysis of the study.  
 
4.1.1 Softstone 
Team at Founding (2004) 
Softstone was founded in 2004 by a team of six technical experts and one 
functional (sales) expert. All the technical entrepreneurial team members were 
either CTO or IT department managers in large IT companies before joining this 
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venture. Although they all possessed technical functional backgrounds as well as 
a fair amount of managerial and executive experience, they have not worked in 
the same prior companies before joining the venture. From the beginning, the 
team was led by a technical CEO who shared nearly equal amount of stock share 
with other members. They quickly decided to position their venture at the niche 
market of banking supervision systems as there are very few competitors in the 
market. 
Emergence Stage (2004-2007) 
From the inception of the start-up, they decided to replicate the formal 
organizational structure from their prior large companies to the venture. Guided 
by this notion, a formalized organizational structure (with complete functional 
departments) was set up from the beginning of the venture. The technical CEO 
was in charge of the whole venture, and the sales expert was Vice President (VP) 
at that time, in charge of the marketing and sales department (i.e., the subsidiary 
in Shanghai). The rest of the technical founders were in charge of other functional 
and business departments. The founding team members mutually agreed on the 
shared obligations as well as issues regarding equity allocation and exit policies. 
According to the exit policies, founding team members who want to exit the 
company during the first two years could not retrieve their investments. And if 
they were to exit from the third year, they could not exit together and must exit 
one by one. And the rest of team members could buy back the leaving members’ 
stocks through a fair competitive bidding process. Although the market was 
highly uncertain and the work pressure was high during product R&D period, 
these equity and exit policies helped ensure the stability of the entrepreneurial 
team during the first several years which were the most critical period for product 
R&D. As the VP said in 2008: 
“We were all senior managers in our prior companies. Hence we applied 
the managerial controls and mechanisms we have used to this venture. We 
mutually decided on the stock shares held by each of us. More importantly, we 
designed an exit policy that none of us could leave the venture in the first two 
years. If someone wants to leave, he could not get his money and stocks back. 
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These mechanisms kept our team stable and enabled us to successfully develop 
our first commercializable product – banking supervision system. We could never 
have the system born if anyone of us left the company in the first two years.” 
Early Growth Stage (2008-current) 
Although the banking supervision system was successfully developed, 
Softstone encountered operational challenges in 2008. The bloom of banking 
supervision system market was delayed due to the financial crisis and recession in 
banking industry in 2008. The market for banking supervision system kept 
crawling and the costs invested in R&D earlier on were not immediately 
compensated. The team members’ work morale was severely dampened. Some 
technical team members lost confidence for the venture’s future. As a result, 5 
technical directors left the venture one by one during 2008. Only the technical 
CEO and the founding VP stayed with the venture. As the VP mentioned in 2008: 
“This year, some technical founders left the company. They withdrew 
because they thought the market prospect (of banking industry) was highly 
uncertain. The technical CEO and I believe that the market growth is just delayed 
and the market will resurge soon. So we keep the venture in operation.” 
Since 2009, as the world financial market recovered gradually from 
recession, the banking supervision market rebounded. The government paid more 
attentions to banking supervision. As a result, there is a quick surge in the need 
for banking supervision by domestic banks. The entrepreneurial team of Softstone 
soon recognized this market change and decided to shift their strategy from 
product R&D to market exploitation. The technical CEO decided to hand over his 
position to the founding VP who possessed market and sales expertise as well as 
rich social capital in the banking supervision industry. Since Softstone was started 
with a complete set of functional departments and managed to preserve it through 
the emergence stage, the venture team quickly found four functional members to 
take charge of those different functional departments through the referrals by the 
new CEO’s friends. Under effective communication channels, these newly-added 
functional members worked coherently with the founders to quickly accelerate the 
production scale and increase the market share. And a CTO with strong technical 
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skills was also brought into the team through the new CEO’s friend’s referral. The 
company thus grew quickly in the customer base at this early growth stage.  
The evolutionary path of Softstone’s entrepreneurial team and the venture 
itself could be summarized in the Figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1. Evolutionary Path of Softstone’s Entrepreneurial Team and the Venture4 
                                                 
4  To ensure the validity of comparison, I adopt Hmieleski and Ensley (2007)’s approach and use two 
different objective measures: revenue growth and employment growth to create a growth index to measure 
the venture performance. Venture performance in a certain year is measured by a growth index which is in 
turn calculated by summing the annual revenue and employee growth rates of the venture. Venture 
performance during a certain stage is gauged by calculating the average of the growth indexes of all the years 




Team at Founding (2007) 
Zion was established in April 2007 by two technical enthusiasts of the 
location-based service (LBS) technologies. They were both software 
programmers in different prior companies. At the beginning, the entrepreneurial 
team was led by the IT CEO with a directive leadership style. There were 12 
technical employees and the venture delivered some pilot projects for different 
customer segments using the location-based technologies. After cost-benefit 
analysis, they decided to dwell on the government clients in this niche market and 
develop smart phone LBS applications for them. 
Emergence Stage (2007-2011) 
From 2007 to 2011, the market of smart phone was not mature enough, 
although the user base started to grow. The niche market for smart phone LBS 
applications was still highly uncertain. There was a technical expert who was a 
friend of the technical CEO joining the entrepreneurial team since there was a 
large profitable project secured by the venture. However, he left the company 
soon after the project was completed in 2010. Later in 2011 another technical 
expert who was a friend of the CEO also joined the team, but also exited the team 
soon after due to conflicts in strategic vision with the CEO. After that, the 
technical co-founder also left the venture due to vision conflicts. The exit of these 
team members induced a large-scale employee turnover and severely jeopardized 
the R&D process. At one point in time, there were only the technical CEO and 
several technical employees left in the venture. As the CEO mentioned in 2011: 
“A friend of mine joined the top management team in last year because 
there was a large project and we needed additional technical directors. But the 
project was not quite successful. Then the guy left the venture. Another friend of 
mine also joined the team in this year, but left the company soon after since he 
didn’t agree with my strategic vision. Soon later the technical co-founder also left 
me, as we diverged on some strategic decisions. Once there were only some 
technical employees staying with me in the venture. Our product R&D was 
disrupted and crawling due to the instability of the management team.” 
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Early Growth Stage (2012-current) 
As the year entered 2012, there was a growing trend of smart phone usage 
around the world. The advantages of LBS technologies were increasingly 
recognized by most of the governmental sectors and large private enterprises. The 
market demand for the smart phone LBS applications was quickly rising. Zion 
decided to jump into this bandwagon. As the market demands grew quickly, the 
CEO recognized that the venture needed a complete functional structure to 
formalize its management so as to scale up their production. As a result, two 
experienced MBA degree holders joined the team through friend’s referral. They 
helped with the brand promotion and structure formalization. However, these two 
MBA left the venture after several months due to conflicts in strategic visions 
with the CEO. Later, the CEO learned from this experience and follow other 
ventures to devise some communication mechanisms to coordinate the members’ 
visions. The venture team became stable and some new functional members were 
engaged through CEO’s friend’s referral in 2012. And some technical managers 
are found through personal networks to join the team in 2013 as well. Finally, the 
venture was able to successfully maintain specialized functional departments and 
scale up their productions. As the CEO recounted in 2013: 
“From 2012, the market started to surge. There were growing suppliers as 
well as customers in this market. Then I realized that our production costs were 
high due to our incomplete functional structure and the absence of specialized 
marketing capabilities. Hence, I found two MBAs through my friends in 2012. 
They helped to market our products and formalize our functional structures. 
However, they left the venture soon after as they thought I interfered too much in 
their decisions. Now I set up communication channels and coordinate frequently 
withthe new functional and technical managers who join the team later.” 
The evolutionary path of Zion’s entrepreneurial team and the venture itself 




Figure 2. Evolutionary Path of Zion’s Entrepreneurial Team and the Venture 
 
4.1.3 Jupiter 
Team at Founding (2002) 
Jupiter was initiated by one IT expert and two functional experts in 2002. 
All of them worked in senior management positions in their prior companies. 
Hence, the team possessed rich IT and managerial experience as well as personal 
contacts in the RFID application systems industry.  
Emergence Stage (2002-2007) 
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At the time of founding, some friends of the CEO advised him to exploit a 
mass market. After some pilot projects on different mass markets, the CEO 
decided to focus on the RFID application systems market. Guided by this strategic 
vision, the founders coordinated with one another cohesively and tried to scale up 
their production levels to compete for market share. Three functional experts (i.e., 
CFO, sales manager, HR manager) were engaged in the team in 2005. The 
venture team was highly efficient as the weekly meetings and effective 
communication channels ensure that all the team members trusted one another 
and committed to the shared strategic goals. The market exploitation was 
successful and the venture quickly occupied a large amount of market share. 
During this stage, the team was led by the IT CEO with a directive style. 
Early Growth Stage (2008-2012) 
As Jupiter jumped into its sixth year of operation, the financial crisis in 
2008 severely damaged the global manufacturing industries. Due to cost concerns, 
most of the companies in the manufacturing industries chose to develop RFID 
systems by themselves. Affected by this depression in manufacturing industries, 
Jupiter had to lower their product price so as to compete with other companies or 
the IT departments in the customers’ companies. This industry-wide depression 
severely reduced the sales revenue and net cash flow of Jupiter. Some team 
members lost confidence for the venture due to the persistence of low sales 
revenues, which prompt them to leave. Four members left the venture in 2010. 
What’s worse, the remaining team members could not attract new members to 
explore new markets since their social networks were heavily embedded in the 
mass market of RFID application systems. Shortly after, Jupiter was bankrupt and 
the entrepreneurial team dissolved. As recounted by the CEO in 2012: 
“The manufacturing industries ran into severe recessions and some team 
members left as we were losing revenues. To make things worse, we could not find 
suitable replacement persons to pursue new opportunities since all the technical 
team members only knew peoplein the RFID market.”  
The evolutionary path of Jupiter’s entrepreneurial team and the venture 




Figure 3. Evolutionary Path of Jupiter’s Entrepreneurial Team and the Venture 
 
4.1.4 Hitech 
Team at Founding (2005) 
Hitech was spun off from its parent to be an independent venture in 2005. 
Hitech was the MIS department in its large MNC parent company. The venture 
was started with a complete functional structure and managed by a CEO and three 
functional managers who were surrogates of the parent firm. The CEO possessed 
abundant managerial and technical experience as well as rich personal social 
capital in the mass market of IT infrastructure operation service.  
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Emergence Stage (2005-2007) 
At the time of founding, the market for Hitech’s business (IT 
infrastructure operation service) was quickly growing. There was a huge market 
demand. But there were also a growing number of suppliers at that time. The CEO 
then decided to strengthen their service operations to quickly expand their 
customer base. In view of that, two functional members were brought into the 
team through the CEO’s friend’s referral. All the team members work coherently 
through the directive leadership by the CEO. As a result, the venture quickly 
scaled up its service intensity and sustained high sales revenue. As the CEO 
recounted in 2008: 
“The market demand was high at that stage. And there were also a 
number of competitors in the market. Therefore, I found two functional 
department managers through friend’s recommendation to improve our operation 
efficiency and service level. I myself decided on the right strategic directions and 
they followed me with high commitment. Thus we worked coherently and quickly 
grew our customer base during the first three years” 
Early Growth Stage (2008-current) 
But when the year came into 2008, the IT infrastructure operation service 
market was reaching its demand threshold, and the revenue gained from the 
service provision was shrinking. Hitech’s CEO then decided to expand their 
business scope and identify new growth opportunities to mitigate the risks. 
Similar to Jupiter, Hitech visioned a strategic diversification strategy during this 
stage. The CEO engaged two new team members with diverse industry 
knowledge through headhunters to explore new business areas. Weekly meetings 
were routinely held for all the team members to exchange their different strategic 
visions and thoughts. As said by the CEO in 2012: 
“From 2008, the market demand was shrinking. Then I decided to try out 
new business lines to spread the risks. Some experts of application development 
and deployment are found as we want to experiment with new services. We still 
have weekly meetings now to align the divergent goals and actions of all the 
members, since we are just serving the same customers with different businesses.” 
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The evolutionary path of Hitech’s entrepreneurial team and the venture 
itself could be summarized in the Figure 4 below. 
 
Figure 4. Evolutionary Path of Hitech’s Entrepreneurial Team and the Venture 
 
4.1.5 Broadline 
Team at Founding (2007) 
Similar to Hitech, Broadline spun off as an independent venture from a 
large MNC corporation in 2007. Broadline provided IT and business process 
outsourcing services to its parent firm. The spin-off was created with a complete 
functional structure and four entrepreneurial team members from different 
functional departments of the parent company. The CEO had over 20 years of 
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managerial experience in IT industry and a broad range of social capital in 
different industries. The vice president was a senior HR manager in the parent 
company before joining the venture. And the other two managers (CTO, COO) in 
charge of operation and IT departments were both IT managers from the parent 
company with abundant technical and managerial experience.  
Emergence Stage (2007-2008) 
During this emergence period, the strategic vision was advised by the 
parent company to focus on the mass market of outsourcing services. At the time 
of founding, the market was growing and a lot of outsourcing suppliers were 
entering into the market. To enhance the competitive advantages in this market, 
three new members were found by the CEO through his personal networks. One 
was in charge of the strategic and global outsourcing business department. The 
other two were senior advisors for the outsourcing services. The CEO, who held 
the largest stock share, designed effective mechanisms to monitor and control the 
behaviors of other team members. During this period, thanks to the inclusion of 
new experienced members and effective direction of the CEO, the venture was 
able to occupy a fair amount of market share in its outsourcing business.  
Early Growth Stage (2009-current) 
From 2009, the market for outsourcing businesses has started to saturate. 
As the CEO has worked in the WLAN industry before and knew a lot of people 
there, he decided to shift the venture’s strategic focus to some new markets (i.e., 
IPR, WLAN). Consequently, two experienced experts from the WLAN market 
were recommended by recruiting agents to join the team and take charge of the 
new WLAN business. Later, the CEO felt that the original outsourcing businesses 
should be further strengthened, thus an expert with abundant managerial and 
technical experience was recommended by one of the founding team members 
and joined the team. Weekly management meetings were held to coordinate team 
members’ cognition and behaviors, so as to ensure that the best strategic visions 
were accepted and shared by all the members. Thanks to effective coordination, 
Broadline successfully diversified its business and enjoyed a continuous high 
venture performance during its early growth stage.  
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The evolutionary path of Broadline’s entrepreneurial team and the venture 
itself could be summarized in the Figure 5 below. 
 
Figure 5. Evolutionary Path of Broadline’s Entrepreneurial Team and the Venture 
 
4.1.6 Wisdom 
Team at Founding (2007) 
Wisdom was founded in April 2007 by a team of two entrepreneurs who 
worked in the same media company before. The CEO was a vice president in the 
media company, who possessed abundant managerial experience and social 
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capital. The CTO was a technical expert who worked as a chief engineer in the 
media company.  
Emergence Stage (2007-2011) 
From the start, the venture was started primarily to exploit the market 
demands in mass media consulting market. Three new members with rich 
experience in the media industry were brought into the management team in 2009. 
Similar to Broadline, the CEO devised effective communication mechanisms to 
transfer his strategic vision to other team members. Thanks to these mechanisms, 
the team preserved high cooperation efficiency in their market expansion 
activities. 
Early Growth Stage (2012-current) 
As the market for media consulting business becomes saturated from 2012, 
the management team decided on a strategic diversification strategy in which they 
would expand their business scope to the social media business. The venture then 
established two subsidiaries to manage each of these two businesses. One month 
later, two experts in the social media industry were introduced to the team by 
headhunters and worked as the general manager and vice president for the social 
media website subsidiary. Later, a COO (chief operation officer) with rich 
industry experience was also brought in as the chief editor for the social media 
website subsidiary. An expert in social media industry was also introduced to the 
management team to help with the development of the social media subsidiary. 
The stock share is more equally distributed among team members. The CEO 
strives to promote autonomous decision making at this time. As the CEO said: 
“Later when the media consulting market started to shrink, we decided to 
expand our business scope to social media. Therefore, I engaged several experts 
to operate the social media subsidiary. I handover most of my stock shares to 
other members and try to motivate them to discover new business opportunities.” 
The evolutionary path of Wisdom’s entrepreneurial team and the venture 




Figure 6. Evolutionary Path of Wisdom’s Entrepreneurial Team and the Venture 
 
As seen from the detailed case descriptions and supporting figures above, 
the evolutionary paths of the six IT entrepreneurial teams share some similarities 
as well as distinctiveness. Some entrepreneurial teams manifest similar evolution 
patterns at certain stages, while some entrepreneurial teams change differently at 
certain stages.  
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Next, I will compare and contrast the evolution paths of the six IT 
entrepreneurial teams by referring to the four basic principles of evolutionary 
theory. The cross-case analysis and comparison will center on the configurations 
and changes in team resources, structures, team learning processes, venture 
strategies, market contexts and venture performance. 
 
4.2 Case Analysis 
The above detailed with-in case analysis shows that the six IT 
entrepreneurial teams manifest various configurations at the time of venture 
founding and different evolution paths at their early stages. In this section, I will 
compare and contrast the evolutions of different IT entrepreneurial teams by 
applying the four basic principles of evolutionary theory (i.e., variation, 
adaptation, selection and retention). Specific analysis will be focused on the major 
components of IT entrepreneurial team evolutions (i.e., team resources and 
structures, venture strategies and market contexts, the team learning processes and 
the resulting performance). More specifically, I will illustrate on how the 
idiosyncratic evolution of the six IT entrepreneurial teams in this study can be 
coherently explained by the four basic principles of evolutionary theory (i.e., 




4.2.1 Variations of Founding Team Structures 
 The six IT entrepreneurial teams have different configurations of 
structures at the time of venture founding (refer to Table 10 below). It emerges 
from the case evidences that the founding entrepreneurial teams vary in their 
structures in terms of both the compositional aspect (i.e., shared working 
experience, shared industry knowledge, and functional heterogeneity) and 
managerial aspect (i.e., leadership style).  
Table 10. Variance of Founding Team Structure 
Venture 










Softstone Low High Low Empowering  
Zion Low High Low Directive  
Jupiter Low High High Directive 
Broadline High High High Directive  
Hitech High High High Directive  
Wisdom High High High Directive  
Shared working experience refers to the past joint working experience 
among the entrepreneurial team members (Beckman 2006). Shared working 
experience among team members allows them to share the same language and 
understandings (Chattopadhay et al. 1999), which decrease the time for decision 
making and coordination (Schoonhoven et al. 1990) and facilitate the execution 
and implementation of ideas (Williams and O’Reilly 1998). In the six cases, 
Softstone, Zion and Jupiter are founded by team members who haven’t worked 
together before, thus their venture teams’ shared working experience at the time 
of founding is low. On the contrary, Hitech, Broadline, and Wisdom are all 
created by a group of members who have worked in some projects or in the same 
companies before. Thus their founding teams’ shared working experience is high. 
Shared industry knowledge denotes the level of team members’ shared 
technical and market knowledge for the same product/service industry (Kor 2003). 
In entrepreneurial ventures, prior industry-specific experience can be especially 
valuable since knowledge of the industry conditions may greatly reduce the 
liability of newness (Cooper et al. 1994). Industry-specific experiential 
knowledge enables the entrepreneurs to identify and assess emerging market 
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opportunities and design proper strategies to exploit the opportunities (Castanias 
and Helfat 2001). Sharing the same industry knowledge by the entrepreneurial 
team members can thus foster the cooperative R&D activities (McGee and 
Dowling 1994) or market exploitations (Roure and Maidique 1986) in the major 
product/service industry of the venture. However, having team members with 
different product/service industry-specific knowledge allows the venture to 
maintain a wide range of businesses, which reduces its business risks and 
increases the rate of survival (Stam and Elfring 2008). The six IT entrepreneurial 
firms in this study are all founded by team members with high level of shared 
industry-specific knowledge in their original product/service industries.  
Besides the shared working experience and industry knowledge, another 
important aspect of team compositional structure is the functional heterogeneity 
among team members. Functional heterogeneity indicates the level of diversity in 
terms of functional backgrounds (e.g., technical, finance, human resource 
management) among entrepreneurial team members (Beckman et al. 2007). 
Having diversity in functional backgrounds ensures that the venture team has a 
complete set of skills and abilities needed to manage the venture (Randel and 
Jaussi 2003). In the six cases, Softstone and Zion are started by founders with the 
same technical backgrounds, while Jupiter, Hitech, Broadline, and Wisdom are 
founded by team members with diverse functional backgrounds. 
 Aside from the compositional structure, the managerial structure also 
emerges as a critical component of team structure. Managerial structure deals with 
roles and controls within the entrepreneurial team. It emerges from the evidence 
that the leadership style is a key dimension of managerial structure. In this study, 
Softstone’s founding team is led by its CEO with an empowering style, where the 
CEO shares rather equal amount of stocks with other members and works as a 
facilitator for other members to share ideas and visions. In contrast, the other five 
IT entrepreneurial teams are led by CEOs with a directive style, in which the CEO 
dominates the decision making authorities and articulate the strategies on his own.  
As evidenced in above, the different founding team compositional 
structures are determined by the experience and knowledge backgrounds brought 
 76 
 
along by entrepreneurial team members to the venture at the time of venture 
founding, while the leadership style is a manifestation of the distribution of 
decision authorities within the team. As will be discussed in the next section, 
these founding team structures need to be constantly adapted to align with the 
venture strategies at different early entrepreneurial stages.  
 
4.2.2 Structural Adaptations by IT Entrepreneurial Team at Different Early  
Stages 
The case descriptions in section 4.1 show that, as the entrepreneurial 
teams evolve with their ventures, their structures change over time within and 
across different early stages, so as to align with their venture strategies, which are 
in turn determined by the surrounding market contexts. 
From the case evidence, three venture strategies (i.e., R&D, market 
exploitation, and strategic diversification) emerge at different early stages. R&D 
strategy refers to the situation whereby an IT venture focuses on research and 
development activities with the aim of developing marketable IT 
products/services for a specific customer segment (Shan 1990). Market 
exploitation represents an IT venture’s activities in marketing its IT 
products/services to customers in a specific industry or customers in different 
industries with the goal of occupying a large market share for these IT 
products/services (Companys and McMullen 2007). Strategic diversification 
means that a venture tries to expand its business scope by experimenting or 
delivering new IT products/services for current or new customers (Iacobucci and 
Rosa 2005).  
Through the case analysis, I discover that the appropriate venture strategy 
at a certain stage is primarily determined by two dimensions of the market 
contexts surrounding the venture: market uncertainty and market competition (see 
Table 11). For example, when the market prospect is highly uncertain and there 
are very few competitors in the market, the ideal venture strategy for the venture 
is R&D. R&D strategy enables the venture to quickly develop new and 
commercializable products/services which attract a certain amount of potential 
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customers (Clark 1991). When the market becomes matured and a growing 
number of competitors enter the market, the best strategy for the venture is market 
exploitation. Market exploitation allows the venture to compete for greater market 
share in a market with known demands (Gans and Stern 2003). However, when 
the market becomes more saturated and the revenues generated from this market 
are shrinking due to extremely high market competition, the strategic 
diversification strategy could effectively reduce the business risks and help the 
ventures open up new revenue streams from new business lines (Hitt et al. 2001). 
Taken as a whole, the two dimensions of market contexts jointly determine the 
appropriate venture strategy that should be pursued at a certain stage.  
Table 11. Market Contexts and Appropriate Venture Strategy 
Venture Strategy 
Market Context 
Market Uncertainty Market Competition 
R&D High Low 
Market Exploitation Low Median 
Strategic Diversification Low High 
As illustrated above, each type of venture strategy has distinctive business 
focuses and resource needs, hence necessitating the entrepreneurial teams to 
nurture appropriate team compositional and managerial structures in order to 
better execute the strategy (refer to Table 12 below). 















R&D High High Low Empowering  
Market 
Exploitation 
Low High High Directive 
Strategic 
Diversification 
Low Low High Empowering  
For instance, when the venture opts for an R&D strategy, joint working 
experience among team members creates a transactive memory system that 
enables the team to effectively and efficiently integrate their member’s expertise 
and skills (Zheng 2012), thereby improving their performance in product/service 
R&D. Entrepreneurial teams with affiliation overlap have higher communication 
effectiveness and a common frame of reference, and have similar priorities and 
 78 
 
vocabularies, which increase their work efficiency (Beckman et al. 2007; 
Chattopadhay et al. 1999). Meanwhile, shared industry knowledge and 
homogeneous technical backgrounds among the team members allow them to 
share personal technical and industry knowledge with one another and reach 
agreements regarding the solutions for technical and business problems 
encountered at development work, thereby accelerating the product R&D 
lifecycle (Yu 2002) or foster incremental service innovations (Liao et al. 2007). 
Taken together, a composition of high shared working experience and shared 
industry knowledge and low level of functional heterogeneity are germane to the 
execution of R&D strategy. Besides, the empowering leadership style could help 
in fostering the creativity and risk-taking among the team members, which allows 
the team to more efficiently and innovatively resolve technical problems during 
R&D. From Figure 1 and Figure 2, Softstone and Zion both pursue the R&D 
strategy at the emergence stage, which prioritizes their needs to create and 
maintain such configuration of venture team structure. For example, Softstone 
was founded by a team without past joint working experience. Hence, they devise 
some mechanisms (i.e., stock share agreement and exit policies) to stabilize the 
team and facilitate the accumulation of joint working experience. However, 
Zion’s CEO failed to change his directive leadership style to empowering one, 
thus creating a misfit with the appropriate managerial structure.  
When the venture engages in market exploitation strategy, shared past 
working experience may create structural and relational lock-ins which hampers 
the market expansion (Gargiulo and Benassi 1999). Sharing low level of joint 
working experience means that the team members possess distinctive contacts and 
social capital they could utilize, thereby broadening the search of distant 
information and opportunities during the market exploration (Beckman 2006). 
Meanwhile, a diverse functional structure with functional specialists overseeing 
different functional roles creates a synergistic effect on the marketing and selling 
of the developed IT products/services (Randel and Jaussi 2003). However, the 
industry knowledge should be kept homogeneous as the ventures are still 
targeting at a fixed product/service market. Hence, market exploitation strategy 
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would be better executed by a team composition with diverse past working 
experiences and heterogeneous functional backgrounds, but with homogeneous 
industry knowledge. For example, in Figure 1 and Figure 2, when Softstone and 
Zion’s venture strategy shifts from R&D at emergence stage to market 
exploitation at early growth stage, the venture teams both try to seek external 
functional experts without collaboration history with them to reduce the shared 
working experience and increase the functional heterogeneity. Apart from that, 
the leadership style should also be tailored to the market exploitation strategy. 
From the case evidence, I find that the ideal leadership style for market 
exploitation is directive leadership. Directive leadership could reduce the potential 
conflicts among different team members, which in turn, speed up the strategic 
decision making that is of critical importance to the market expansion. For 
instance, both of Softstone and Zion tried to preserve a directive leadership style 
when they engage in market exploitation at early growth stage. Similarly, in 
Figure 3, 4, 5 and 6, the founding teams of Jupiter, Broadline, Hitech and Wisdom 
all retained directive leadership when involving in market exploitation. 
Furthermore, the strategic diversification strategy differs from market 
exploitation strategy in that it requires a diverse set of industry knowledge in the 
team. When IT entrepreneurial teams strive to spread the market risks by 
diversifying their business lines to opportunities that are not in their current 
product/service markets, having a diverse pool of product/service industry 
knowledge in the team is a prerequisite. A large number of team members from 
different product/service lines enable the venture to experiment with a wide range 
of new businesses, and choose those which are promising and profitable to exploit 
(Stam and Elfring 2008). In Figure 4, 5, and 6, to successfully diversify their 
businesses at the early growth stage, Hitech, Broadline and Wisdom all manage to 
involve entrepreneurial team members with industry knowledge that are distinct 
from their original businesses, so as to reduce their teams’ shared industry 
knowledge. In addition, the suitable leadership style for strategic diversification is 
empowering leadership, as empowering could offer all the team members more 
flexibility and privileges to try out new ideas and pursue new opportunities.  
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4.2.3 Selection of Appropriate Alignment between Team Structures and 
Venture Strategies by Venture Performance  
Case evidences from Figure 1 to Figure 6 show that all the six IT 
entrepreneurial teams are able to recognize the best venture strategies that should 
be pursued under idiosyncratic market contexts at different stages. But not all the 
IT entrepreneurial teams could adjust their team structures to align with the 
identified strategies, which leads to discrepancies in their venture performance. 
For those IT entrepreneurial teams who are capable of adapting their structures to 
their temporal venture strategies of a stage, their ventures enjoy high performance 
and successfully achieve the strategic goals of that stage. However, those 
entrepreneurial teams who are incapable of coupling their compositional and 
managerial structures with the strategic needs of a stage, their venture 
performance will be dragging, which may result in team turbulence and even, 
team dissolution. For instance, in Figure 1 and Figure 2, both Softstone and 
Zion’s venture teams are founded by members without past joint working history, 
which mismatches with their R&D strategy at the emergence stage. Softstone 
manages to devise certain managerial mechanisms to keep their team stable and 
increase the shared working experience, thereby enjoying a high performance in 
their R&D activities. However, Zion doesn’t have necessary regulations and 
controls to nurture shared working experience, nor do they have sufficient 
communication and coordination channels because of the directive leadership 
style, hence suffering from a high turnover rate that severely destructs their R&D 
continuity. Another failure example in Figure 3 is the bankrupt of Jupiter at its 
early growth stage. Although the team members realize the need for strategic 
diversification, they are unable to engage suitable people beyond their current 
product market to reduce their high level of shared industry knowledge, nor does 
the team leader change his leading style and distribute his decision authorities. 
This in turn results in venture bankruptcy and team dissolution.  
Table 13 and Table 14 below summarize the different configurations 
among team structure, venture strategy and market contexts and their interactional 
effects on the venture performance. 
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Softstone Low-High High Low Empowering R&D High Low High 
Zion Low High Low Directive  R&D High Low Low 
Jupiter Low High High Directive  Market 
exploitation  
Low  Median High 
Hitech High-Low High High Directive  Market 
exploitation  
Low Median High 
Broadline High-Low High High Directive  Market 
exploitation 
Low Median High 
Wisdom High-Low High High Directive  Market 
exploitation  
Low Median High 
 























Softstone High-Low High Low-High Directive  Market 
exploitation  
Low Median High 
Zion Low High Low-High Directive  Market 
exploitation  
Low Median High 
Jupiter Low-High High High Directive  Market 
exploitation 
Low  High Low (bankrupt) 
Hitech Low High-Low High Empowering  Strategic 
diversification 
Low High High 
Broadline Low High-Low High Empowering  Strategic 
diversification 
Low High High 
Wisdom Low High-Low High Empowering  Strategic 
diversification 
Low High High 
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Taken together, the IT entrepreneurial team structure has to be constantly 
adapted to align with the appropriate venture strategies in different market 
contexts, so as to ensure the survival and growth of the venture. Good alignment 
between team structure and venture strategy could foster venture performance, 
whereas misalignment between team structure and venture strategy may 
jeopardize the venture performance. Poor venture performance signals the 
mismatches between team structure and venture strategy, which, if not properly 
resolved through structural adaptation, would result in team turbulence and even 
dissolution. As a result, the venture performance works as a selection mechanism 
to filter out IT entrepreneurial teams which are incapable of adapting their 
structures to the venture strategies at different early stages.   
From the discussion in the above sections, a process of the structural 
adaptation by IT entrepreneurial teams could be drawn (see Figure 7 below). The 
structural adaptation process starts when the IT entrepreneurial teams proactively 
scrutinize and assess the contemporary market contexts of their current 
product/service industry. The market uncertainty and market competition are 
correctly gauged during this step. Then the IT entrepreneurial teams engage in the 
formulation and articulation of venture strategies that fit with the current market 
contexts. After determining the venture strategy to pursue, the IT entrepreneurial 
teams look into their team structures and strive to adapt their compositional and 
managerial structures to the venture strategy chosen. After the structural 
adaptation, IT entrepreneurial teams constantly evaluate their immediate venture 
performance to see whether the structural adaptation raises the venture 
performance to a higher stable point. When there are changes in the venture 
performance after the stable point is reached, this may implies mismatches among 
the market contexts, venture strategy and team structure. In such situation, the IT 
entrepreneurial teams initiate a second round of structural adaptation in which 




Figure 7. Process of Structural Adaptation by IT Entrepreneurial Teams 
 
4.2.4 Influential Factors for Structural Adaptation: Team Founding   
Resources and Team Learning Processes 
It is also emerged from the case evidences from Figure 1 to Figure 6 that 
the process of structural adaptation by IT entrepreneurial teams is influenced by 
two major factors: team founding resources and team learning processes (see 
Table 15 and Table 16 below for a summary).  
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Softstone High High High Low - Congenital;  
- Collective 
Low-High High Low Empowering R&D  High 
Zion High Low High Low - Grafting Low High Low Directive R&D Low 




Low High High Directive Market 
exploitation  
High 





High-Low High High Directive Market 
exploitation  
 High 





High-Low High High Directive Market 
exploitation 
High 












































Softstone High High High Low - Experiential; 
- Grafting  
- Collective 
High-Low High Low-High Directive Market 
exploitation 
 High 




Low High Low-High Directive Market 
exploitation 
High 
Jupiter High High High Low - Experiential; 
- Collective 
Low-High High High Directive Strategic 
Diversification 
Low (bankrupt) 






Low High-Low High Empowering Strategic 
Diversification 
 High 






Low High-Low High Empowering Strategic 
Diversification 
High 











There are altogether two major types of resources possessed by the IT 
entrepreneurial teams in this study. One type of resource is the human capital 
possessed by the teams, which further consist of the IT experience and managerial 
experience. The IT and managerial experience possessed by the team members 
are two key aspects of human capital that could be utilized in the development of 
new ventures (Beckman et al. 2007; Welbourne and Cyr 1999). They represent 
the accumulated IT and managerial experience that the team members gain from 
their past or current working experience on IT or executive positions (Beckman et 
al. 2007). From Table 15, all the six ventures are founded by teams with high IT 
experience. Founders of all the ventures have a long tenure in the IT industry, 
hence possessing rich IT experience. Such rich IT experience possessed by 
entrepreneurial teams allows them to steer their strategic visions by experimenting 
with different IT deliverables and selecting those which are promising. Besides, 
except for Zion, Softstone, Jupiter, Hitech, Broadline, and Wisdom are all 
founded by team members with rich managerial experiences. The founding team 
members of these ventures have functioned in executive positions in their prior 
companies for a number of years, thereby having rich hands-on managerial 
experience. Such managerial experience enables entrepreneurial teams to devise 
effective controlling mechanisms and sanctions to achieve structural adaptation. 
 Apart from the human capital, another important but much less studied 
team resource is the social capital possessed by the team (Stam and Elfring 2008). 
The social capital of IT entrepreneurial team denotes the aggregated external 
resources and capabilities that are accessible to the IT entrepreneurial team 
through the personal relations of the team members (Partanen et al. 2008). 
Entrepreneurial team members heavily rely on their extensive and rich personal 
contacts to promote new products, and to develop new markets and new ways of 
production and distribution (Floyd and Wooldridge 1999; Stam and Elfring 2008). 
Two primary types of social capital of entrepreneurial teams are critical for the 
venture performance: intra-industry social capital (Tsai 2001) and extra-industry 
social capital (Perry-Smith and Shalley 2003). The two types of social capital 
provide ventures with access to different social resources (Geletkanycz and 
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Hambrick 1997). Intra-industry social capital refers to the personal contacts and 
relations possessed by the founding team within the industry of the venture’s 
major products/services industry. This kind of intra-industry social capital 
consists of the intra-industry network ties of the founding team, and represents the 
network centrality of the team in its major product/service industry networks 
(Brass et al. 2004). High level of intra-industry social capital, or high network 
centrality in the major product/service industry networks allows the venture to 
quickly identify, access, and mobilize external valuable resources in its current 
major industry networks, which enhances the viability and competitiveness of the 
venture (Tsai 2001). From table 15, all the six IT entrepreneurial firms are built 
by a team of founders with rich personal contacts in the industries of their original 
IT products/services. Thus, the six founding teams have high intra-industry social 
capital. Such high level of intra-industry social capital provides the 
entrepreneurial teams with necessary links to access to different talents and 
experts, which facilitates their structural adaptation.  
In addition to the intra-industry social capital, another social capital type 
possessed by the entrepreneurial team is the extra-industry social capital. Extra-
industry social capital denotes the personal contacts that the IT entrepreneurial 
team could utilize beyond its original product/service industry (Stam and Elfring 
2008). The extra-industry social capital is constituted by the extra-industry 
bridging ties that could be appropriated by the venture team to experiment or 
launch new products/services that significantly depart from current offerings, 
which facilitates their venture’s business expansion and diversification needs 
(Aldrich and Fiol 1994). From table 15, all the six founding teams do not possess 
personal contacts beyond their major product/service industries, thereby having a 
low level of extra-industry social capital. But some of the entrepreneurial 
founding teams manage to increase their extra-industry social capital at their early 
growth stage, hence being able to involve members for the new diversified 
business lines. 
In addition to the resources possessed by the founding team, another 
notable observation from the case evidences is that the six IT entrepreneurial 
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teams have adopted various types of entrepreneurial learning, which also help in 
the structural adaptations at different early stages.  
There are altogether five types of team learning processes that are 
prominent in the case evidences. The first type is congenital learning. Congenital 
learning is the process of knowledge acquisition by IT entrepreneurial team 
members through their own past experience before joining of the venture (Huber 
1991). Congenital learning occurs when the IT entrepreneurial team members 
bring along their own past experience as knowledge stocks to the new venture 
(Bruneel et al. 2010). Several teams in this study have founders who have worked 
at managerial positions in large companies before they start their ventures, hence 
they make use of their past managerial experience through the congenital learning. 
For example, in table 15, the founding team of Softstone consists of members 
with rich managerial experience in prior large companies. Hence, they 
intentionally copy the team management mechanisms they have used in their prior 
large companies to this venture. These managerial interventions enable 
Softstone’s founding team to overcome the lack of joint working experience 
among the team members, which in turn leads to the success of product R&D. 
Similarly, in table 15, the IT entrepreneurial teams of Jupiter, Hitech, Broadline, 
and Wisdom have worked as department manager taking charge of certain 
departments or subsidiaries in large MNCs. Hence, when they decided to exploit a 
profitable mass market, they follow the practices they have used in their former 
companies and elect a directive leader who effectively navigate their ventures. 
A second type of IT entrepreneurial team learning is the experiential 
learning. Experiential learning, also termed as learning by doing, is the process of 
acquiring new knowledge through direct experience of starting and operating the 
current ventures (Nelson 2008). IT entrepreneurial teams could continuously learn 
from their first-hand experience of managing the current ventures. They can learn 
from the changes in external market environment and the immediate operation 
and performance of the venture. This kind of learning typically precedes the 
recognition of the appropriate venture strategy or the needs for strategy shifts and 
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corresponding adaptations to the team structure. For example, in table 16, 
Softstone and Zion learn from the growing demand and competition of their 
product markets, thereby trying to engage professional functional team members 
to exploit their growing market needs. In a similar vein, Broadline, Hitech, and 
Wisdom all learn from their gradually shrinking revenue and market demand of 
their original product/service markets, thereby attempting to diversify their 
business lines. Moreover, in table 15, Jupiter decides to only exploit the market of 
RFID application system at their emergence stage when they complete a 
comparative cost-benefit analysis among various product lines. Similarly, Zion 
decides to serve the government customers first at their emergence stage as they 
discover from pilot projects that the applications for government sectors are easy 
and cost-effective to develop. In this way, experiential learning ensures the teams 
to recognize appropriate venture strategies which can direct the adaptation of their 
team structures.  
A third type of learning is vicarious learning, also termed as inter-
organizational learning, whereby the IT entrepreneurial teams learn by observing 
and imitating the real-time strategies and operations of other organizations in the 
same markets, or following the advises and suggestions offered by external 
experts  (Denrell 2003; Huber 1991). This type of learning allows the venture 
teams to acquire real-time “know how” from the strategies, administrative 
practices, technologies of other organizations (Dhanaraj et al. 2004; Levitt and 
march 1988; Simonin 2004). First, vicarious learning by IT entrepreneurial teams 
may shorten the time for reaching an appropriate venture strategy for their 
structural adaptation in a specific context (Bruneel et al. 2010; Yli-Renko et al. 
2001). Although the literature found both positive and negative consequences of 
the vicarious learning (Dutton and Freedman 1985), the case evidences in this 
study generally suggest that vicarious learning is beneficial for the venture teams’ 
strategic and structural agility. For example, in table 15, when doing R&D, Zion 
decides to imitate the development paths of large mobile application companies in 
which they try to focus on only one customer industry to develop their offerings, 
and then duplicate the same business model to other customer industries in later 
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stages. For another example, Jupiter, Hitech, Broadline, and Wisdom follow the 
advices and suggestions provided by their partners or investors to exploit a mass 
market at the emergence stage. Second, vicarious learning could advice the IT 
entrepreneurial teams on the methods of structural adaptation. For example, 
Hitech, Broadline and Wisdom imitated the use of headhunters by other 
entrepreneurial teams and engaged diverse industry experts for diversification at 
their early growth stage. Taken as a whole, similar to experiential learning, 
vicarious learning also helps the venture teams in the structural adaptation process. 
A fourth learning type is the grafting (Huber 1991). Grafting is a type of 
learning process in which organizations increase their knowledge base by 
acquiring new members who possess knowledge not previously available within 
the organization (Huber 1991; Lyle 1988). In table 16, the introduction of 
functional specialists by Softstone and Zion and the engagement of experts with 
diverse industry knowledge by Hitech, Broadline, and Wisdom at the early 
growth stage are representative examples of such grafting process. This type of 
learning brings in professional functional experts or industry experts, enabling the 
teams to realize the structural adaptation at different early stages. 
The last type of IT entrepreneurial team learning, which concerns about 
the internal communication and social integration within the IT entrepreneurial 
team, is the collective learning (Wang and Chugh 2013). Different from the 
previous four types of learning which emphasize the acquisition of new 
knowledge, collective learning explains how the acquired new knowledge are 
shared among all the team members to generate collective strategic cognitions 
(Easterby-Smith et al. 2000; Wang 2008). Collective learning enacts when the 
mutual learning among team members takes place (March 1991) and social 
interactions are enabled (Jones and Macpherson 2006). It is cumulative, 
interactive, and public in nature, and works as a channel for temporal and spatial 
knowledge transmission (Capello 1999). Collective learning could generate 
shared strategic cognition among members, which help them maintain appropriate 
team structures and effectively execute their venture strategies (Ensley et al. 2002; 
Wang 2008). From table 15 and table 16, the six IT entrepreneurial teams in this 
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study all devise various channels and mechanisms to facilitate the knowledge 
sharing and social interactions among their team members, except for Zion at its 
emergence stage. For example, through regular management meetings, some IT 
entrepreneurial teams are able to collaboratively and effectively make strategic 
decisions, constantly align their members’ strategic visions and behaviors, and 
work coherently to achieve shared strategic goals. Similarly, the informal 
socialization activities adopted by some IT entrepreneurial teams are also 
effective mechanisms to coordinate the affections and cognitions among different 
team members, thereby generating emotional connections and enabling 
constructive cognitive conflicts.   
A prominent finding from the case analysis is that the entrepreneurial 
team’s founding resources and team learning processes complement with each 
other to facilitate the process of structural adaptation. On one hand, IT 
entrepreneurial team learning helps to fully and effectively release the values of 
founding resources. First, the congenital learning by IT entrepreneurial teams is 
built on their founders’ IT and managerial experience (i.e., human capital) at prior 
companies. For instance, the founders of Softstone congenitally learn from their 
past executive experience at large companies and quickly design both positive and 
negative sanctions to nurture an environment for team members to increase shared 
working experience at its emergence stage. Moreover, the CEO learnt from his 
past executive experience and equally distributed decision authorities among team 
members from the start of the venture, which creates an empowering leadership 
style that catalyzes the R&D. On the contrary, founders of Zion did not possess 
any executive experience before starting the venture. Hence they neither devised 
control mechanisms nor nurtured an empowering working context during their 
emergence stage, hence going through a painful and destructive team turnover 
process during this stage. Similar to Softstone, enlightened by their past executive 
experience in large MNCs with diversified business lines, the founders of Jupiter, 
Hitech, Broadline, and Wisdom managed to preserve a directive leadership style 
at the emergence stage. Hence, the congenital learning works to fully exploit the 
human capital endowed by the founders from their prior executive experience. 
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Second, the grafting of new functional or industry experts by IT entrepreneurial 
teams is sometimes built on their founders’ social capital (intra-industry contacts 
in this study). For example, founders of Zion, Hitech, Broadline, and Wisdom all 
rely on their rich personal contacts in their major industries to engage 
supplementary technical experts or complementary functional experts at 
emergence stage. Similarly, the IT entrepreneurial founders of Softstone and Zion 
managed to find suitable functional specialists at their early growth stage through 
their personal networks in their focal markets. These grafting activities aided the 
IT entrepreneurial teams in reducing the shared working experience that misfit 
with market exploitation need. Finally, the collective learning process could also 
be sourced from the managerial experience of the founders. Entrepreneurial 
founders with certain amount of managerial experience have the cognitive 
awareness to design necessary collective learning mechanisms (e.g., management 
meetings, informal socialization) for the teams. In table 15 and table 16, most of 
the venture teams devise necessary collective learning channels based on their 
managerial experience. Taken together, the case evidences suggest that the 
various types of learning could maximally unleash the power of the IT 
entrepreneurial team’s founding resources to accelerate structural adaptation. 
However, the team learning processes, in return, could also optimize the 
use and sometimes, transform the resource possessed by founding teams. First, 
learning could help the IT entrepreneurial teams identify the appropriate venture 
strategy to pursue, which prescribes the direction for structural adaptation. For 
instance, the experiential learning and vicarious learning work as two processes 
for the venture teams to identify the appropriate venture strategies and 
corresponding team structures. Without these two types of learning, venture teams 
are unable to selectively and effectively utilize their founding resources for 
structural adaptation. In table 15, the recognition of R&D strategy by Softstone 
precedes their use of the stock share agreements and exit policies. Similarly, in 
table 16, the realization of shrinking venture performance by Jupiter, Hitech, 
Broadline and Wisdom prompts them to make the strategic choice of 
diversification. Second, the learning could transform the resources held by 
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entrepreneurial founders. For example, the insufficiency in founders’ resource 
endownments could be remedied by the joint effect of vicarious learning and 
grafting. One prominent case scenario for such supplementary effect in this study 
is the vicarious learning and grafting of industry experts by Hitech, Broadline and 
Wisdom at their early growth stage. Although founders of these three ventures do 
not possess any extra-industry social capital, they follow the practices of other 
entrepreneurial firms and resort to the help of headhunters in discovering experts 
from new business lines. The combination of vicarious learning and grafting helps 
to increase their venture teams’ extra-industry social capital, ensuring their 
successful strategic diversification. In contrast, the founders of Jupiter did not 
learn from other’s experience and ask for help from external recruiters, thereby 
failing to diversify their business and resulting in team dissolution and bankruptcy. 
Third, the learning could sometimes even transform the resources possessed by 
the entrepreneurial founders. For another example, the deficiency in managerial 
experience of founders can also be made up by experiential learning and vicarious 
learning. A typical case scenario for such transformation process in this study is 
the experiential learning and vicarious learning by Zion’s CEO at their early 
growth stage. The founding CEO of Zion learns from the withdrawals of technical 
members at the emergence stage and the exits of two MBAs at the early growth 
stage, and realizes that the resigns of these members are partly due to the lack of 
shared strategic visions. The learning of this cause-effect link is a kind of 
experiential learning by the CEO from his real-time management experience at 
the current venture. After that, the CEO of Zion also learns from the management 
practices of other successful ventures, thereby devising necessary communication 
mechanisms to align team members’ strategic visions and behaviors. These two 
learning processes (i.e., experiential and vicarious learning) both enrich the 
CEO’s managerial experience, hence enabling him to maintain a directive 
leadership style at this stage.  
Taken together, the case materials suggest that various types of 
entrepreneurial learning processes not only help to fully and more efficiently 
unleash the values of founding resources, but also work to mobilize and transform 
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the founding resources to accelerate the structural adaptation. Hence, we argue 
that the IT entrepreneurial team’s founding resources and learning processes 
complement with each other in enhancing the efficiency of structural adaptation.  
In Figure 8 below, I integrate all the emerged concepts and relationships 
among the concepts into a theoretical contemplate, in order to illustrate the 
operating mechanisms underlying the evolution of IT entrepreneurial teams. The 
four evolutionary principles salient in the above discussion offer theoretical 
rationales for different aspects of team evolution, which are the major constituents 
of a contextualized theoretical framework of IT entrepreneurial team evolution 
(refer to Figure 9 below). Firstly, there are variances in the team structure at the 
time of venture founding. Secondly, the team structure must be constantly adapted 
to align with different venture strategies at different early stages, which are in turn 
formulated in accordance with the temporary market contexts surrounding the 
venture. Thirdly, the alignment between team structure and venture strategy 
significantly influences the performance of the venture. The venture performance 
acts as a selection mechanism to sift out those unfit team structures and venture 
strategies from those appropriate ones. Lastly, the founding team’s resources and 
IT entrepreneurial team learning processes complement with each other to 








Figure 9. Theoretical Framework of IT Entrepreneurial Team Evolution 
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CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION 
In the next chapter, I will talk about the major contributions of the findings 
of this study to the theories. First, I will discuss the contributions of my findings 
to the literature of strategy formulation and change in IT entrepreneurial firms. 
Then, I will elaborate on how the venture team’s structural adaptation resembles 
the process of continuous organizational change and time-paced evolution 
proposed by Brown and Eisenhardt (1997). Next, I will explain how the 
complementarity between IT entrepreneurial team’s founding resource and 
learning processes integrate the discourses of imprinting and the learning in the 
entrepreneurial team literature and help to explain the efficiency issue in IT 
entrepreneurial team’s structural adaptation. Lastly, inspirations of the findings to 
relevant literatures on team turnover are also provided.  
 
5.1 Influential Factors on IT Venture Strategy Formulation and Change 
 Entrepreneurial teams usually start their ventures with the aim of 
exploiting the market opportunities (Shane and Venkataraman 2000). The venture 
strategies adopted by IT entrepreneurial teams are hence advised by two 
dimensions (i.e., market uncertainty, market competition) of the market contexts 
of their major deliverables. As aforementioned, the structural adaptation process 
of IT entrepreneurial teams starts with the scrutinizing of market contexts for their 
current IT deliverables. When the market uncertainty is high and there are very 
few competitors in the market, the best strategy for a venture is R&D. When the 
market becomes established and a growing number of competitors join in, the 
appropriate venture strategy is market exploitation. But when the market profits 
start to shrink due to market saturation or economic recession, the strategic 
diversification prioritizes other strategies and becomes the major focus.  
 From the case studies, there are two generalized patterns that could help us 
better understand the venture strategy formulation and change within and across 
the two early stages (see Table 17 and Table 18). Some IT entrepreneurial firms 
(i.e., the so-called “innovator” (Aldrich and Kenworthy 1999)) launch their 
ventures in immature niche markets with the goal of achieving first-mover 
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advantages. At their emergence stage where the primary organizational goal is 
survival (Hite and Hesterly 2001), they face the pressures to design and develop 
marketable IT deliverables and generate returns as soon as possible (Scott and 
Bruce 1994). Hence, their strategic focuses are typically directed towards R&D. 
When they reach the early growth stage, the niche markets become more certain 
and a growing number of players enter, they see the escalating of market profits 
and are thus prompted by the needs to occupy a large amount of market share for 
their commercializable IT deliverables, so as to grow beyond mere survival and 
sufficiency (Hite and Hersterly 2001). Thus, their venture strategies will shift 
from R&D to market exploitation. Conversely, some other IT entrepreneurial 
firms (i.e., the so-called “imitator” (Aldrich and Kenworthy 1999)) are born in 
relatively matured mass markets and thus pay more efforts to generate revenues 
from the huge market demands for survival from the beginning. Hence their 
strategic attentions are geared towards the market exploitation at the emergence 
stage. As they arrive at their early growth stage, the mass markets exploited 
become saturated and profits start to shrink; hence, they tend to start seeking 
growth opportunities in new markets (Luo 2002).   
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A great number of entrepreneurship researchers have adopted the life 
cycle perspective to distinguish the venture development into different stages, 
ranging from four to nine (e.g., Brockner et al. 2004; Cardon et al. 2005; 
Reynolds and White 1997; Vanaelst et al. 2006; Vohora et al. 2004). Clarysse and 
Moray (2004) suggest that entrepreneurial teams “evolve through the alteration of 
periods of equilibrium, in which underlying structures permit only incremental 
change, and periods of revolution, in which these underlying structures are 
fundamentally altered” (p. 76). They portray the evolution of entrepreneurial 
teams as a process of self-organizing punctuated equilibria in which shocks in the 
environment induce the shifts of team from one stage to another. However, the 
case data in this study suggest that the evolution of entrepreneurial teams more 
closely resembles the process of continuous change and time-paced evolution 
proposed by Brown and Eisenhardt (1997). This process differs with the 
punctuated equilibrium path by highlighting the continuous element of IT 
entrepreneurial team’s structural adaptation. In this continuous process, an 
appropriate venture strategy of a certain stage is determined by the real-time 
market conditions, the structures of IT entrepreneurial teams have to be constantly 
adapted to fit with the changing venture strategies and market conditions 
immediately after the teams are founded. When the structure of founding team 
does not fit with venture strategies at emergence stage, the team structure has to 
be adjusted within the emergence stage. And when the venture experiences 
market changes and is shifting from emergence stage to early growth stage, the 
team structure has to be re-adapted across the stages to align with the new 
appropriate venture strategy. In this way, the continuous structural adaptation of 
IT entrepreneurial teams in this study provides empirical supports for the 
theoretical arguments by Siggelkow and Levinthal (2005) that organizational 
attributes must be constantly adapted in response to changes internal and/or 
external to the organization. 
The first episode of structural adaptation emerged from the case data 
resides within the venture’s emergence stage, in which the founding teams adapt 
their structures so as to better execute the immediate venture strategy at this stage. 
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Some IT entrepreneurial teams start in niche markets with high uncertainty but 
low competition; hence they devote their attentions to R&D at the emergence 
stage and strive to build a team structure with shared working experience, shared 
industry knowledge, homogeneous technical backgrounds, and empowering 
leadership. Other IT entrepreneurial teams initiate their operations in mass 
markets with low uncertainty and growing competition, thus are prompted to 
pursue market exploitation at the emergence stage and attempt to maintain a team 
structure with diverse working experience and functional heterogeneity, but 
shared industry knowledge and directive leadership. At the end of emergence 
stage, IT entrepreneurial teams encounter different opportunities as well as threats 
from the change of market conditions. As a result, a second episode of structural 
adaptation comes in place at the juncture of emergence stage and early growth 
stage. Some IT entrepreneurial teams see a growing supply and demand in their 
niche markets, and hence decide to shift from R&D to market exploitation and 
strive to nurture a team structure with heterogeneous working experience and 
functional backgrounds, but shared industry knowledge and directive leadership. 
Other IT entrepreneurial teams experience either saturation or recession of their 
original mass markets, thereby strategically diversifying to new markets by 
changing their structures to a configuration of heterogeneous working experience, 
functional backgrounds and industry knowledge, as well as empowering 
leadership.  
This continuous process of structural adaptation however, cannot be 
successfully carried out when the IT entrepreneurial teams neither possess 
resourceful founders nor engage in proactive entrepreneurial learning. Integrating 
the resource-based view of entrepreneurship (Alvarez and Busenitz 2001) with the 
learning perspective in strategic entrepreneurship (Hitt et al. 2001; Ireland et al. 
2003), this study suggests that a dynamic capability for IT entrepreneurial teams 
to renew their structures to achieve congruence with changing strategies and 
environments hinge on the continuous exploitation and transformation of the 




5.3 Efficiency of Structural Adaptation: Complementarity of  
Imprinting and Learning Perspectives 
As aforementioned, the resource possessed by founding team complement 
with the team’s learning behaviors to determine the efficiency of structural 
adaptation by IT entrepreneurial teams.  
On one hand, the rich managerial experiences and social capital held by 
the entrepreneurial founders could not be fully exploited without the presence of 
various team learning processes. Indeed, entrepreneurship researchers adopting 
the path dependence view have repeatedly highlighted the significant imprinting 
effects of entrepreneurial founding team’s resources (Gillis et al. 2013; Kor 2003). 
It has been argued, both theoretically and empirically, the resources embedded in 
the founding teams, such as managerial experience, industry status, and personal 
social capital, are valuable for a wide range of venture performance outcomes, 
such as the attraction of VC (Beckman and Burton 2008); the venture growth in 
terms of employees, revenues, and total assets (Heirman and Clarysse 2005); and 
the IPO (i.e., initial public offering) (Beckman et al. 2007). Researchers 
promoting the imprinting effects of entrepreneurial founders have noted that the 
professionalization process is extremely difficult and thus very hard to realize 
(Audia and Rider 2005). Thus, the ventures will be better off when started by 
teams with broad managerial experience (Beckman and Burton 2008) and wide 
range of industry contacts (Packalen 2007). However, it is still unclear through 
what ways the founders’ resources influence the structural agility and venture 
viability. More specifically, the underlying mechanisms and causal links for the 
founders’ resources to affect the venture strategic formulation and team structural 
adaptation have received much less attention. The case evidences in this study 
clearly demonstrate that the learning processes by IT entrepreneurial team stand 
as a critical mediating mechanism for the founders’ resources to accelerate the 
venture team’s structural adaptation. In my findings, the congenital learning, 
grafting, and collective learning are three critical processes allowing the IT 
entrepreneurial founders to utilize their resources to foster team structural 
adaptations at different early stages. First, IT entrepreneurial founders learn from 
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their prior executive experience and reuse the positive (e.g., stock share allocation) 
and negative (e.g., exit policies) managerial sanctions they have adopted in 
previous companies to the nascent ventures. This kind of duplication from their 
own past experience represents the congenital learning by entrepreneurial 
founders, and effectively improves the venture team stability and shared working 
experience at the emergence stage. Without the intention and action to learn from 
the past executive experience by the founders, the design of necessary team 
management mechanisms is impossible. The absence of such control mechanisms 
might offer leeway for mass member resigns that severely dampen the venture 
performance, as shown by the scenario of Zion’s emergence stage. Second, the 
introduction of new members with professional functional experience or 
supplementary technical knowledge by the IT entrepreneurial founders at 
emergence and early growth stages is a kind of grafting process exploiting their 
intra-industry social capitals. It strengthens the ventures’ technical capabilities 
and functional expertise for their R&D or market exploitation. Third, the design 
of collective learning mechanisms also depends on the managerial experience of 
the founders.  
On the other hand, the important role of entrepreneurial learning processes 
in the utilization and transformation of the founding resources could never be 
discounted. First, findings of this study suggest that the experiential learning and 
vicarious learning are indispensable for the proper utilization of founding 
resources. Without the formulation of appropriate venture strategy through these 
two learning types, founding resources could not be purposively mobilized for 
structural adaptation. Second, this study also implies that certain types of learning 
work together to transform the founding resources for faster structural adaptation. 
Prior entrepreneurship research relying on the organizational learning perspective 
has justified the role of entrepreneurial learning in the transformation of 
entrepreneurial resources and strategies (Clarysse and Moray 2004). Findings of 
this study echoes this research stream and suggest, several types of learning 
processes could alter the resources inherited by the founders from their past 
experience, hence optimizing their resources for faster structural adaptation. Two 
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dimensions of founding resources could be transformed by different 
entrepreneurial learning processes. First, entrepreneurial founders without 
managerial experience could make up for this disadvantage by learning from their 
own experience of operating the focal ventures (i.e., experiential learning) or 
learning from the best practices of other venture teams (i.e., vicarious learning). 
Second, entrepreneurial founders lack of sufficient extra-industry social capital 
and personal contacts beyond their focal markets could still get access to experts 
at distant markets by imitating the use of third-party recruiting agents in other 
entrepreneurial firms (i.e., vicarious learning and grafting). These proactive 
learning behaviors can help the entrepreneurial founders remedy their inherited 
insufficiencies, thereby attaining appropriate team structures for the venture’s 
strategic pursuit.   
Probing deeper into the six cases, it can be implied that the enhanced 
efficiencies in the structural adaptation processes by IT entrepreneurial teams at 
different stages are actually the results of different elements of founding resources 
and learning processes. In below, I will illustrate this contemplation by comparing 
the different evolutionary paths of different IT entrepreneurial teams. 
Comparing the evolutionary path of Softstone to that of Zion, it seems to 
suggest that rich managerial experience of the founders, congenital learning as 
well as collective learning by the team are all critical components to foster the 
structural adaptation process. The founders of Softstone possessed rich executive 
experience, which allows them to devise effective control and communication 
mechanisms that help to stabilize the team during the tough R&D period. In 
contrast, the founders of Zion were IT workers without any managerial experience. 
Although they kept engaging new IT experts through their social networks, the 
team members differ with one another on strategic visions as there was no 
effective communications among them. What’s worse, there was also no 
contractual obligations or severe penalties for withdrawal. Hence the team 
experienced a high turnover which restricted them from attaining the appropriate 
structure. It was not until the early growth stage did the founders of Zion realize 
their insufficiencies of managerial experience and the criticality of managerial 
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mechanisms. Hence, it is implied that IT entrepreneurial teams would have higher 
evolution efficiency when their IT founders possess certain amount of managerial 
experience and engage in congenital and collective learning processes. 
Comparing the evolutionary path of Jupiter to those of Hitech, Broadline 
and Wisdom, it is reasonable to propose that vicarious learning and grafting are 
two key processes that transform the founding resources for faster structural 
adaptation. Founders of the four ventures all have no extra-industry social capital 
from the start. When their venture strategy shifts from market exploitation to 
strategic diversification at the early growth stage, founders of Hitech, Broadline 
and Wisdom imitated the utilization of social resources (i.e., headhunters and 
recruiting agents) by other ventures and successfully increase their extra-industry 
social capital through open recruitment. On the contrary, founders of Jupiter did 
not have an eye on external best practices, hence failing to break up the 
competency traps in the current industries. Therefore, it is advised that IT 
entrepreneurial teams would have higher evolution efficiency when their founders 
proactively learn from their peers in the market. 
Taken as a whole, findings of this study clearly show that the founders’ 
resources and team’s learning processes complement with each other in fostering 
the team’s structural adaptation at their early stages. Past literature has provided 
numerous insights for the imprinting effects of founders (e.g., Leung et al. 2013) 
and the prominent role of entrepreneurial learning (e.g., Deakins and Freel 1998). 
However, these two research streams are largely developed in silo with their own 
theoretical foundations. Findings in this study suggest that the imprinting effects 
of founders’ resources and entrepreneurial team learning actually go hand in hand 
in determining the potency and agility of IT entrepreneurial teams.  
 
5.4 Antecedents and Consequences of Team Turnover 
The simultaneous examination of founder’s resources and entrepreneurial 
team learning in this study also echoes and enriches the literature on 
entrepreneurial team turnover (e.g., Boeker and Wiltbank 2005; Forbes et al. 2006; 
Ucbasaran et al. 2003). Table 19 below synthesizes the causes for team member 
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entrance and exit in the six teams. From this table, it is suggested that the member 
entrance and member exit are motivated by different sets of factors.  
 












1. Softstone (2009, 
one CTO) 
2. Zion (2010, one IT 
expert) 
3. Zion (2011, one IT 
expert) 
4. Zion (2013, three IT 
experts) 
5. Jupiter (2005, three 
functional exeperts) 
6. Broadline (2008, 
one functional 
expert and two IT 
experts) 
7. Broadline (2009, 
one IT expert for 
the outsourcing 
services) 
8. Wisdom (2009, 
three IT experts 
with media industry 
experience) 
9. Wisdom (2012, one 
functional expert) 
1. Softstone (2009, 
four functional 
experts) 
2. Zion (2012, two 
functional experts) 
3. Zion (2012, two 
functional 
managers) 
4. Hitech (2007, two 
functional experts) 
 
1. Hitech (2008, two 
business managers 
for new businesses) 
2. Broadline (2009, two 
IT experts for the 
new IPR and WLAN 
businesses) 
3. Wisdom (2012, two 
IT experts for the 
new social media 
subsidiary) 
4. Wisdom (2012, one 
IT expert with 





Intrapersonal Conflict Interpersonal Conflicts 
on Strategic Vision 
Personal Family Reason 
Supporting 
Case Scenarios 
1. Softstone (2008, 
five technical 
founders) 
2. Zion (2010, one 
technical manager) 
3. Jupiter (2010, four 
functional 
members) 
1. Zion (2011, one 
technical manager) 
2. Zion (2011, one co-
founding IT expert)  
3. Zion (2012, two 
functional experts 
1. Broadline (2008, VP) 
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In line with Forbes et al. (2006) who found that new member entries are 
motivated by resource-seeking, my findings show that the introduction of new 
members to the team is usually preceded by the venture’s need for supplementary 
resources, complementary resources, or resources for diversification. When a 
venture needs to strengthen its product/service quality in order to better serve the 
customers, or reduce its production costs to generate more profits, new members 
with rich technical expertise or industry experience will be brought into the team 
to supplement the existing technical and industry knowledge pools and 
capabilities. When the venture is prompted by fierce market competition to 
improve operational efficiency, experts with specialized functional knowledge 
will be engaged into the team to reduce the operational costs. In addition, when 
the venture plans to diversify its business scope to create new revenue streams, 
members with knowledge and experience in different product/service industries 
will be involved to experiment with new business opportunities. From the case 
evidences in the six figures of section 4.1, it is possible that these three motivators 
may simultaneously present at a certain stage of a venture, prompting the venture 
to search experts with various types of knowledge and experience.  
Different from the entry of new members, the withdrawals of existing 
team members are usually triggered by intrapersonal conflicts or interpersonal 
conflicts in strategic vision. Intrapersonal conflict should be distinguished from 
interpersonal conflict. Intrapersonal conflict concerns one individual person, 
while interpersonal conflict implies different persons. Intrapersonal conflict 
happens when people feel torn between what they want to do and what they think 
they should do (O’Connor et al. 2002). When a venture steps into financial 
difficulties due to opportunity delay or market recession, the low venture 
performance may create a discrepancy between the team members’ personal 
ambitions with the venture’s ambitions (Vanaelst et al. 2006), which in turn, 
prompts some of them to leave. Moreover, when the divergence in strategic 
visions among team members is not reconciled by collective learning mechanisms, 
affective conflicts may arise and team members with less powers and authorities 
may exit the team (Ensley et al. 2002).  Apart from these two major motivators, a 
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minor reason for member exit is personal family reason. In line with new member 
entry, a similar observation is that these different antecedents may operate at the 
same development stage of a venture, accounting for the withdrawals of different 
team members. 
Echoing Beckman et al. (2007), findings of this study suggest that entrants 
to the IT entrepreneurial team enhance the survival and growth of the venture. 
The entry of new members bring in various kinds of experience and knowledge, 
as well as social capitals, which enhance the potency of the venture team in 
pursuing different venture strategies. However, Vanaelst et al. (2006) suggested 
that although newly-added team members bring in different kinds of experience 
and knowledge, they do not introduce new strategic cognitions to the team. They 
attribute the reinforcement of cognitive homogeneity to the fact that researchers 
or technology transfer officers prefer to involve people who share the same 
strategic vision with them. The case data in this study offer another possible 
explanation for this cognition reinforcement by highlighting the role of collective 
learning in building a shared strategic vision. The case evidences show that, as the 
new strategic directions are typically initiated by founders, even though the new 
members with different strategic cognitions join the team, their strategic 
cognitions are quickly adapted to align with the founders through collective 
learning processes. Those new members who failed to align their cognitions with 
the founders are likely to exit the team within a short time. This collective 
learning ultimately results in shared strategic visions among all the team members. 
In this sense, the collective learning works as a sifter filtering out those members 
who hold different strategic visions with the founders. This in turn, reinforces the 
importance for IT entrepreneurial founders to formulate appropriate strategic 
directions for their ventures. 
Past studies on the performance implication of team member exits have 
offered contradicting results based on different theoretical lenses. Some 
researchers adopt the human capital perspective to suggest that the departing 
members would bring along valuable tacit and explicit knowledge and resources 
away with them, thereby jeopardizing the venture performance (Cascio 1999; 
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Dess and Shaw 2001). Some other scholars rely on the strategic entrepreneurship 
perspective to postulate that the exit of poor performers from the team would have 
a positive implication for performance (Chandler et al. 2005). Findings of this 
study integrate these two contradicting views and suggest that the effects of 
member exits hinge on the resources possessed by the leaving members. When 
the leaving members possess resources that are compatible with the venture’s 
temporary strategy, their exits will hollow the capabilities of the venture and 
impose a negative consequence for the performance. But when the ventures are 
shifting to a new strategy, the departures of members with resources that are 
incompatible with the new strategy would pave the way for the IT entrepreneurial 
team to readjust their structural configurations, thereby accelerating the strategic 
shifts (Haveman and Khaire 2004). More specifically, the exits of unsuitable team 
members could release a fair amount of stock shares, which can then be utilized to 
recruit new members that are more suitable (Brunninge et al. 2007). And the 
withdrawal of homogeneous members may sometimes help break out the 
cognitive or relational lock-ins in the teams (Gargiulo and Benassi 1999), which 
reduces the efforts for the remaining team members to re-adjust their roles 





CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS 
 In this study, I have explored the dynamic development of IT 
entreprenerial teams through the theoretical lens of evolutionary theory. The 
longitudinal multiple-case design employed in this study has provided a detailed 
description and clear discrimination of the resources, structures, learning 
processes, venture strategies and the market contexts of IT entrepreneurial teams. 
I find that IT entrepreneurial team’s evolution can be well interpreted by the four 
basic principles of evolutionary theory (i.e., variation, adaptation, selection and 
retention). IT entrepreneurial teams are typically started with various team 
structures. And the various team structures have to be constantly adapted within 
and across the early stages to align with the changing venture strategies 
determined by the market conditions. The evolution of IT entrepreneurial team’s 
structure in this study closely resembles the process of continuous change and 
time-paced evolution proposed by Brown and Eisenhardt (1997). This continuous 
structural adaptation process is enabled and accelarated by the joint effects of 
founding resources and team learning processes. The imprinting effects of 
founding resources and various learning processes by IT entrepreneurial teams 
could also help explain the antecedents and consequences of team turnovers. In 
this section, I will first present the theoretical and practical contributions of my 
research. Then I will discuss about some limitations of this study and illuminate 
potential future research directions. Towards the end of this paper, some 
concluding remarks will also be provided. 
 
6.1 Theoretical and Practical Contributions 
This thesis makes several distinct and important contributions to the 
literature. In particular, seven contributions deserve special attention. First, the 
thesis enriches the IS literature by developing a contextualized theory of the IT 
entrepreneurial team evolution. Although IS researchers have realized the ongoing 
marriage between IT and entrepreneurship (Del Giudice and Straub 2011), 
research efforts on the IT entrepreneurship are rather limited. IT industry is 
characterized by high growth rate (Pilat and Wolfl 2004) and high risks (Lasch et 
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al. 2007) stemming from high technological volatility (Anderson et al. 2000), high 
market uncertainty (Mendelson 2000) and high market competition (Kim et al. 
2000). These idiosyncratic traits of IT industry offer both more opportunities and 
challenges for ventures operating in the IT industry. By tracing and examining the 
evolutionary paths of different IT entrepreneurial teams’ structures, this study 
contextualizes the evolutionary theory of firm to the IT entrepreneurial team and 
provides a systematic discourse for the evolution of IT entrepreneurial team. 
Second, unlike past studies which commonly adopt a static approach (e.g., 
Beckman et al. 2007; Chowdhury 2005; Talaulicar et al. 2005), this study 
enriches the entrepreneurship research by adding critical elements of realism and 
dynamism to the field. In particular, this study addresses an important research 
gap and shed lights on how IT entrepreneurial teams co-evolve with their 
changing venture strategies and market contexts by adapting their structures 
within and across different early stages. To achieve both survival and growth, two 
major evolutionary paths of IT entrepreneurial team’s structure have been 
identified and examined. The first evolution path starts with the increase in shared 
working experience, shared industry knowledge and functional homogeneity to 
the decrease of shared working experience and increase in shared industry 
knowledge and functional heterogeneity at the early growth stage. The 
appropriate managerial structure also changes from empowering leadership to 
directive leadership. The second evolution path emerges from the decrease of 
shared working experience and increase of shared industry knowledge and 
functional heterogeneity at emergence stage, to the decrease in shared working 
experience and industry knowledge and increase of functional heterogeneity at the 
early growth stage. And the corresponding appropriate managerial structure 
changes from directive leadership to empowering leadership. Charting these two 
evolution paths are not random events or coincidences, but rather very well-
conceived venture strategies (jointly determined by market uncertainty and 
market competition) (Clarysse et al. 2011, York and Venkataraman 2010; Zou et 
al. 2010). Hence, the findings on the team structure adaptation and evolution 
further corroborates with the upper echelon theory (Hambrick and Mason 1984). 
 111 
 
Additionally, the distinction between these two types of evolution paths also goes 
in parallel with the distinction between innovator (i.e., entrepreneurs entering 
emerging market) and imitator/reproducer (i.e., entrepreneurs entering established 
market) by Aldrich and Kenworthy (1999). 
Third, this thesis stands amongst the earliest ones explicitly applying the 
evolutionary theory to the study of IT entrepreneurial teams. The dynamic 
developments of IT entrepreneurial teams along their ventures’ lifecycle appear to 
be well captured by theoretical insights of the evolutionary theory. A very limited 
number of studies have taken an evolutionary perspective towards the 
entrepreneurial teams (e.g., Chan 2009; Clarysse and Moray 2004; Vanaelst et al. 
2006). However, the insights from adopting such evolutionary lens have not yet 
made the way into the mainstream entrepreneurial team literature. Existing 
entrepreneurship research has shown the great explanatory powers of the 
evolutionary theory for the development of entrepreneurial firms (e.g., Aldrich 
and Martinez 2001; Breslin 2008; Hite and Hersterly, 2001; Hite 2005; Uzunca 
2011). This thesis further shows that the basic principles of evolutionary theory 
can be fruitfully applicable to the study of IT entrepreneurial teams. In line with 
the evolutionary theory, my findings show that the four fundamental principles 
(variation, adaptation, selection and retention) (Aldrich and Martinez 2001) are all 
salient in the evolution of IT entrepreneurial teams. IT entrepreneurial teams are 
founded with various structures. And the mismatches between team structures and 
venture strategies under temporal market conditions prompt the teams to 
continuously adapt their structures so as to survive and grow, a process bearing 
high resemblance to the continuous change and time-paced evolution proposed by 
Brown and Eisenhardt (1997). Those teams which fail to initiate and implement 
continuous structural adaptations will be challenged by low performance or even 
be eliminated from the entrepreneurial arena. As advancement for the 
evolutionary theory of firm, this study also discovers that the IT entrepreneurial 
team’s founding resources and team learning processes complement with each 
other in influencing the efficiency of the continuous structural adaptations.  
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Fourth, this thesis reconciles the two contradictory research streams in the 
entrepreneurial team literature. This study integrates the imprinting effects of 
founding resources and the entrepreneurial learning into a complementary 
discourse to explain the structural adaptation of IT entrepreneurial team. Past 
studies have justified that the resources possessed by entrepreneurial founders 
could significantly enhance the viability and performance of the venture (e.g., 
Brinckmann et al. 2011; Gillis et al. 2013; Kor 2003; Leung et al. 2013). However, 
the underlying mechanisms for the founders’ resources to affect performance are 
still largely unknown. This study discovers that the various learning processes by 
IT entrepreneurial teams work as such underlying mechanisms to fully unfold the 
values of founders’ resources. Without necessary learning processes, the human 
and social capitals embedded in the entrepreneurial founders’ intellectual and 
relational resources could never be capitalized on. In addition, past studies have 
also noted the transformative effects of entrepreneurial learning on resources and 
strategies of the nascent ventures (e.g., Deakins and Freel 1998; Knockaert 2011). 
While my findings acknowledge the existence of imprinting effects of founding 
resources on team evolutions, they also promote that the insufficiencies in the 
founding resources may be remedied by the proactive entrepreneurial learning 
behaviors of the entrepreneurial founders. By doing that, this study successfully 
combines both the imprinting perspective and learning perspective into a coherent 
discourse of IT entrepreneurial team evolution. 
Fifth, by specifying different antecedents and outcomes for team member 
entry and exit, findings of this study amplify the emerging literature of team 
turnover. Developing prior studies on the antecedents of member entry and exit 
(Forbes et al. 2006; Vanaelst et al. 2006), this study proposes that new member 
entries are typically necessitated by the venture’s needs for supplementary, 
complementary and diversification resources, whereas member exits are usually 
caused by intrapersonal conflicts incurred by low venture performance and 
interpersonal conflicts in strategic visions due to the absence of effective 
collective learning.  Apart from that, this study suggests the collective learning as 
a prominent explanation for the past observations that newly added members 
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bring in various knowledge and expertise, but do not significantly alter the 
existing strategic visions (Beckman et al. 2007; Vanaelst et al. 2006). Besides, 
this study also helps reconcile two contradictory perspectives on the performance 
implication of member exits. One stream of research adopts the human capital 
perspective to suggest that the withdrawing members take away valuable 
knowledge and networks with them, which hollows the venture and destructs the 
performance (Cascio 1999; Dess and Shaw 2001). Another stream of research 
builds on a strategic perspective to argue that the departure of top management 
team members, especially those who perform unsatisfactorily, may sometimes 
offer the IT entrepreneurial teams opportunities to adjust their team structures 
through the additions of new members (Chandler et al. 2005; Wiersema and 
Bantel 1993). This study integrates these two conflicting streams by justifying 
that the influences of member exits on performance are contingent on the 
resources possessed by the leaving members.  
Sixth, the utilization of longitudinal qualitative data in this thesis enables 
the examination of the reverse effects of venture performance on the evolution of 
IT entrepreneurial team. Past literature on entrepreneurial teams is overwhelmed 
by cross-sectional or quantitative studies which generally regard the venture 
performance as outcomes of team composition and processes (e.g., Chowdhury 
2005; Ensley 1999; Lim et al. 2013). Some recent researchers have called for 
more longitudinal research to reveal the potential feedback loops from venture 
performance to the structures and processes of the entrepreneurial teams (e.g., 
Vyakarnam and Handelberg 2005). I have shown that the use of longitudinal 
qualitative data can provide valuable insights for this reverse causality. In this 
study, the rising and falling of venture performance are found to provide a chance 
for the team members to review their venture strategies and corresponding team 
structures , thereby continuously adapting their team structures. By doing so, this 
thesis also contributes to the solicitation for more research on the feedback 
process from entrepreneurial outcomes by Aldrich and Martinez (2001). 
Seventh, by tracing the evolution paths of low performing and failed IT 
entrepreneurial teams, this study gains from a close examination of the 
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entrepreneurial team failures and enhances our understanding of the key failure 
factors for team entrepreneurship. Overwhelmed by a “success” bias in the 
selection of research subjects (Ruef et al. 2003), entrepreneurship research has 
unravelled a variety of “key success factors” that contribute to the survival and 
growth of entrepreneurial teams. Nevertheless, it is still unclear why 
entrepreneurial teams fail and dissolve. It has been noted that the “key failure 
factors” are as important as the “key success factors” in understanding 
entrepreneurship phenomenon (Low and MacMillan 1988). Thus far, only a 
scarcity of entrepreneurship research manages to incorporate both the successful 
and failed entrepreneurial teams in their analysis (e.g., Gurdon and Samsom 2010; 
Pennings et al. 1998; Wu et al. 2010).Without considering the “dark side” of 
team-based entrepreneurship and examining the reasons for entrepreneurial team 
failures, existing literature on entrepreneurial team may be one-sided and 
effective team management and risk mitigation strategies are unattainable. My 
findings fill this important gap and indicate that IT entrepreneurial teams whose 
founders neither possess rich founding resources nor engage in proactive 
transformative learning are deemed to fail.  
My research also has valuable implications for practitioners. In particular, 
four groups of practitioners can benefit from the insights offered. First, 
entrepreneurial teams-to-be are challenged by looking both internally and 
externally to their teams for the solutions to grow their ventures. This thesis 
shows that internally, the team’s structure must be constantly adapted to align 
with the strategic needs of the venture. Externally, the entrepreneurial teams 
should be alert to both the beneficial opportunities and destructive threats from 
the environments surrounding them, so as to formulate appropriate venture 
strategies. Failing to be cognizant about the deficiencies in their structures as well 
as the inappropriateness of venture strategies would render the IT entrepreneurial 
teams at the mercy of the turbulent environmental changes that typically 
characterize the high-tech entrepreneurship. Moreover, the team’s founding 
resources and learning processes have a synergistic effect to accelerate successful 
structural adaptation. Only by fully exploiting their founding resources and 
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proactively transforming these resources can the IT entrepreneurial teams agilely 
evolve and navigate their ventures throughout the rough journey at their early 
stages. 
Second, consultants/advisors engaged in providing advices to IT 
entrepreneurial teams can also benefit from addressing the critical roles of both 
inherited founding resources and entrepreneurial learning. Without doing so, 
advices given may fail to resolve the misalignments between structures and 
strategies, which have no improvements for the survivability and sustainability of 
the ventures. Continuous and comprehensive evaluations on the team resources, 
structures, learning processes, venture strategies, and external contexts are 
indispensable for keeping the viability and potency of IT entrepreneurial teams. 
Third, venture capitalists/investors often play a significant role in the 
development of the team. This thesis shows that the resource supports and 
behavioral suggestions offered by these parties are extremely valuable for the 
survival and growth of the venture. The resources infused by investors may foster 
the benign development of IT entrepreneurial teams, especially when the 
resources are necessary for the structural adaptation by the team. Necessary 
guidance for learning activities should also be provided by these parties along the 
whole entrepreneurial lifecycle, so as to save the time and efforts to reach 
appropriate structures at different stages.  
Fourth, following the discussion above, policy makers, when tracing the 
evolutions of IT entrepreneurial teams, need to contemplate two things. First, the 
critical role of founding resources for the survival and growth of IT 
entrepreneurial teams can never be undermined. As shown, poor founders’ 
resources may lead to the failure of the team. Hence, necessary intellectual and 
social supports should be promptly provided by the government to assist the 
teams initiated in markets and regions with penurious resource endowments. 
Second, as this thesis highlights the transformative role of learning, policy makers 
should encourage the exchanges and disseminations of successful teaming and 




6.2 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Before I offer some future research directions, I acknowledge some 
limitations in this study. First, my study has identified market uncertainty and 
market competition as two critical factors that determine the appropriate venture 
strategy and corresponding team structure at a certain stage. While we opine these 
two are the main determinants, it may be moderated by drastic external 
environment, such as economy downturn (Brondizio et al. 2009; Ishihara and 
Pascual 2009; Stam and Elfring 2008). However, as aforementioned, the six IT 
entrepreneurial firms all have not experienced such drastic environmental shocks 
along their development. Second, the six IT entrepreneurial firms in this study can 
choose to adapt their structures when the need arises. This may sometimes be 
difficult if external influential investors or shareholders are more assertive in 
dictating that certain members be in or out of the team. While I expect this 
situation to be possible, I did not observe significant influence from external 
investors/shareholders in the six cases of this study.  
Although my research has contributed to our understanding of the 
evolution of IT entrepreneurial teams, there are potential avenues for future 
research. First, although this research has empirically justified the significant 
effects of learning processes by entrepreneurial team in enabling and fostering the 
structural adaptation, a basic assumption drawn from the case evidences of this 
study is that, the new venture strategies identified through the experiential or 
vicarious learning by entrepreneurial founders are appropriate ones for the 
ventures to effectively excel in a new market condition. However, it is possible 
that the identified new venture strategies are sometimes inappropriate or 
suboptimal. The entrepreneurial founders may have cognitive bias which prompts 
them to make inaccurate judgments and strategic decisions (Aspinwall et al. 2005; 
Gartner 2005; Jong et al. 2011). In addition, entrepreneurial founders may blindly 
and unselectively imitate the strategies of other organizations without sufficient 
discretions and considerations of the current situations of their focal ventures (Li 
and Kozhikode 2008). All these possibilities point to the salient effects of the 
founder’s cognitive factors on their strategic regulations. Hence, future 
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researchers are encouraged to incorporate the cognitive schemes and potencies of 
the founders into their studies and collect empirical data to verify their potential 
effects. 
Second, this thesis has established a contextualized theory for the 
evolution of IT entrepreneurial teams. However, whether such contextualized 
theory is generalizable to other team contexts (e.g., Top management team (TMT), 
project team) worth researching. Entrepreneurial teams, just like the TMTs and 
project teams in large organizations, strive to meet the strategic and financial 
objectives of their firms. However, entrepreneurial teams differ with TMTs and 
project teams since they are usually formed voluntarily, and all the team members 
have a vote to decide the team constitutions (Sarasvathy 2001). Therefore, further 
research is warranted to apply the findings of this study to other team contexts to 
compare and contrast the similarities and differences in their evolutionary paths. 
Third, this study has provided empirical support for the feedback effects of 
venture’s financial performance on the evolution of entrepreneurial teams. 
However, whether the findings of this study could be safely applied to the context 
of social entrepreneurial teams warrants further contemplations. Unlike the for-
profit entrepreneurial teams examined in this study, social entrepreneurial teams 
may operate their ventures with a set of different motivations and ambitions. For 
example, they may put more concerns on the social values created, rather than the 
financial and economic values (Short et al. 2009). Therefore, apart from the 
financial and operational viability, there may be some other intangible dimensions 
of venture performance (e.g., social reputation, social responsibilities, and social 
status) that are influential to the evolutions of social entrepreneurial teams (Dacin 
et al. 2011). Future researchers applying the insights of this study to social 
entrepreneurial teams must be aware of these differences. 
 
6.3 Concluding Remarks 
With the growing popularity in team-based entrepreneurship in 21
st
 
century, the need for a close inspection of the evolution of IT entrepreneurial 
teams becomes extremely urgent. Scholars and practitioners work at the 
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crossroads between IS and entrepreneurship should keep on examining the 
phenomenon of IT entrepreneurship. Only by doing so could IT ventures more 
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Appendix 1: Process of Building Theories from Cases Study Research suggested by Eisenhardt (1989) 
Step  Activity Reason 
Getting Started Definition of research question 
Possibly a priori constructs 
Focuses efforts 
Provides better grounding of construct measures 
Selecting Cases Neither theory nor hypotheses 
Specified population 
Retains theoretical flexibility 
Constrains extraneous variation and sharpens external validity 
Theoretical, not random, sampling Focuses efforts on theoretically useful cases – i.e., those that 
replicate or extend theory by filling conceptual categories 
Crafting Instruments and 
Protocols 
Multiple data collection methods Strengthens grounding of theory by triangulation of evidence 
Qualitative and quantitative data combined  Synergistic view of evidence 
Multiple investigators Fosters divergent perspectives and strengthens grounding 
Entering the Field Overlap data collection and analysis, including 
field notes 
Speeds analyses and reveals helpful adjustments to data collection 
Flexible and opportunistic data collection 
methods 
Allows investigators to take advantage of emergent themes and 
unique case features 
Analyzing Data Within-case analysis Gains familiarity with data and preliminary theory generation 
Cross-case pattern search using divergent 
techniques 
Forces investigators to look beyond initial impressions and see 
evidence through multiple lenses 
Shaping Hypotheses Iterative tabulation of evidence for each 
construct 
Sharpens construct definition, validity, and measurability 
Replication, not sampling, logic across cases Confirms, extends, and sharpens theory 
Search evidence for “why” behind relationships Builds internal validity 
Enfolding literature Comparison with conflicting literature Builds internal validity, raise theoretical level, and sharpens 
constructs definitions 
Comparison with similar literature Sharpens generalizability, improves construct definition, and raise 
theoretical level 
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Appendix 3: Samples of Selective Coding 
Constructs Definitions Examples of Quotes Key Phases 
R&D IT venture focuses on research and 
development activities with the aim of 
developing a marketable IT product/service 
for a specific customer segment (Shan 1990) 
“In 2007, the LBS application market  was still 
at its infancy. The market is highly uncertain 
cause there are very few smart-phone users. And 
there are very few producers in the market. 
Hence we decided to pool our resources to R&D 
to gain first-mover advantage. (CEO – Zion, 
2010) 
“…we decided to pool our resources to R&D to 
gain first-mover advantage…” 
Market Exploitation IT venture dwells on marketing/selling its IT 
product/service to different profitable 
customer segments to occupy a large market 
share (Companys and McMullen 2007) 
“As we started in a market with relatively certain 
supplies and demands, we try our best to expand 
our customer base at the survival stage (CEO – 
Hitech, 2008)  
“…we try our best to expand our customer base 
at the survival stage…” 
Strategic Diversification IT venture tries to expand its business scope 
by experimenting and delivering new IT 
product/service for current or new customers 
(Iacobucci and Rosa 2005)  
“The market of ITO/BPO services became 
matured from 2009 and our revenue was 
dropping due to fierce competition from large 
incumbents, thus we strive to look for new 
growth opportunities in other industries (CEO – 
Broadline, 2012)  
“…we strive to look for new growth 
opportunities in other industries…” 
Intrapersonal Conflict Discrepancy between the team members’ 
personal ambitions with the venture’s 
ambitions (Vanaelst et al. 2006) 
“Our venture was suffering from financial 
problems due to the delay of market surge. One 
of the IT experts left me due to the low dividend.” 
– CEO, Zion, 2012   
“…One of the IT experts left me due to the low 
dividend.” 
Interpersonal Conflict on 
Strategic Visions 
Divergence in strategic visions between IT 
entrepreneurial team members (Ensley et al. 
2002) 
 
“One IT expert exits within one year since he 
disagreed with me on which customer segment 
we should focus on to develop our product.” – 
CEO, Zion, 2012 
“…he disagreed with me on which customer 
segment we should focus on…” 
“The two MBAs left the company since they don’t 
think my strategic decision of targeting on 
government and SMEs customers a good 
choice.” – CEO, Zion, 2012 
“…they don’t think my strategic decision of 
targeting on government and SMEs customers a 
good choice…” 
Congenital Learning The learning by entrepreneurs toward the 
knowledge stocks and past experience they 
brought into the venture at founding (Huber 
1991) 
“Most of the founders have worked as CIOs or 
technical directors at large companies for many 
years. Hence we learn from our past managerial 
experience and devise various managerial 
incentives and controls to keep the team stable, 




such as stock share allocation and exit policies.” 
–CEO, Softstone, 2008 
“My working experience in senior management 
positions of the parent which is a multi-business 
company inspires me to set up two independent 
yet inter-related subsidiaries to manage the two 
businesses.” – CEO, Wisdom, 2012 
“…My working experience in senior 
management positions of the parent which is a 
multi-business company inspires me…” 
Experiential Learning The learning by entrepreneurs from their 
own direct experience of starting and 
managing the current venture 
(Balasubramanian 2011; Corbett 2005; 
2007) 
“We recognize from the increasing purchase 
orders and market entrants that the market (for 
banking supervision system) is recovering. Hence 
we quickly switch our strategic focus from R&D 
to market exploitation and try to bring in 
functional specialists.” – CEO, Softstone, 2009 
“…We recognize from the increasing purchase 
orders and market entrants that…” 
“We have done several pilot projects on different 
systems at the start of the venture. Then we did 
cost-benefit analysis and opportunity-risk 
analysis on the project results. The RFID 
application systems appeared to the most 
profitable market. Hence, we decided to maintain 
a complete functional structure to exploitthis 
market.” – CEO, Jupiter, 2008 
“…we did cost-benefit analysis and opportunity-
risk analysis on the project results…The RFID 
application systems appeared to the most 
profitable market…” 
Vicarious Learning Entrepreneurs mimetically learn from the 
experiences and knowledge of other firms or 
learning from external advices (Bingham and 
Davis 2012; Holcomb et al. 2009; Jones and 
Macpherson 2006) 
“Most of the famous mobile apps companies 
started their business by delivering products for 
a certain customer segment, then applying the 
successful business models to different customer 
segments. We learn from this logic and try to 
strengthen our technical capabilities to develop a 
modular application for a specific customer 
segment. Then when the market blooms in the 
future, we can modify the same application to 
quickly occupy the market.” – CEO, Zion, 2010 
“Most of the famous mobile apps 
companies…We learn from this logic…” 
“At the start, an investor from the parent 
company advised me to start (the venture) by 
exploiting the growing IT infrastructure 
operation services market. Hence, I follow his 
suggestions and search for functional experts to 
scale up our service level.” – CEO, Hitech, 2008 
“…an investor from the parent company advised 
me… I follow his suggestions…” 
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Grafting The introduction of new members with 
distinctive knowledge that is not previously 
available within the venture (Huber 1991; 
Lyle 1988) 
“I realized that what constrains our growth is the 
absence of a complete functional structure and 
marketing specialization. Thus I found two MBAs 
through my personal networks to help with the 
formalization of functional departments and 
marketing of our products to different 
customers.” – CEO, Zion, 2012 
“…I found two MBAs through my personal 
networks …” 
“Later when the media consulting market started 
to shrink, we decided to expand our business 
scope to social media. Therefore, I engaged two 
experts from social media industry as the general 
manager and VP for the social media 
subsidiary.” – CEO, Wisdom, 2013 
“…I engaged two experts from social media 
industry…” 
Collective Learning The “social process of cumulative 
knowledge, based on a set of shared rules 
and procedures which allow individuals to 
coordinate their actions in search for 
problem solutions” (Capello 1999, p. 354) 
“From the start (of the venture), we hold regular 
(i.e., weekly, monthly, annually) management 
meetings to make strategic decisions and jointly 
resolve the conflicts. We also communicate now 
and then during daily operations whenever 
problems arise.” –CEO, Broadline 2008 
“…we hold regular (i.e., weekly, monthly, 
annually) management meetings to make 
strategic decisions and jointly resolve the 
conflicts. We also communicate now and then 
during daily operations whenever problems 
arise…” 
“We regularly launch some informal social 
networking sessions among team members at 
leisure time, such as tea breaks, company 
dinners, or company trips. We believe these 
informal socializations help build cooperative 
and trusting relationships (among team 
members), which sets the stage for them to 
communicate and exchange their ideas, and 
generate radical innovations.” – CEO, Hitech, 
2012 
“…We regularly launch some informal social 
networking sessions…” 
 
